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CRIMINAL JUSTICE CITIZENSHIP
Daniel S. McConkie, Jr.*
Abstract
The American criminal justice system is fundamentally democratic
and should reflect an ideal of citizenship that is equal, participatory, and
deliberative. Unfortunately, the outcomes of criminal cases are now
almost always determined by professionals (prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges) instead of by juries. This overly bureaucratized
system of adjudication silences the voice of the people. A better system
would strengthen “criminal justice citizenship,” which refers to the right
of the citizenry to participate, directly and indirectly, in the criminal
justice system and to deliberate in its workings.
The three key principles of criminal justice citizenship are
membership, participation, and deliberation. Membership refers to who
can participate and whether they can participate on an equal basis. Where
the justice system adheres to this principle, people enjoy a greater sense
of belonging, solidarity, and trust in government. Participation refers to
public participation in democratic processes, such as jury service.
Deliberation refers to structured dialogues between lay persons that affect
governmental decisions. Institutions and procedures must be designed to
give the people an important role in government, but the nature and extent
of that role should be limited by other considerations, such as procedural
accuracy and preventing racial discrimination.
This theory of criminal justice citizenship has important applications
to jury trials. Regarding membership, providing broad and equal
opportunities for jury service is necessary for democratic legitimacy and
fair and effective deliberations. Regarding deliberation, jury trials need
to be more transparent; the prevailing procedures of jury deliberations
need to be modified; and unanimous verdicts must be required to protect
the voice of potentially marginalized jurors. Regarding participation, jury
trials are so rare that it will be necessary to improve criminal justice
citizenship by democratically reforming other aspects of the criminal
justice system, such as plea bargaining. The overarching principle is that
the people need a more significant role in criminal adjudication, not only
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because popular participation is good for defendants, but also because it
strengthens American democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
While the American criminal justice system has made some important
substantive and procedural advances in the last century, it has also lost
something essential: its local, democratic character. Crucially, the
outcomes of criminal cases are now almost always decided by
professionals instead of by juries. Scholars have studied this and
proposed several ways to give juries a greater role in adjudication.1 These
proposed reforms promise to improve the quality and fairness of criminal
justice for defendants, but they may also provide a whole other set of
important and insufficiently explored benefits relating to the health of this
country’s democracy. Strengthening and expanding the American jury
system would help to revitalize “criminal justice citizenship.” Put simply,
criminal justice citizenship refers to the rights and privileges of the
citizenry to participate directly in some aspects of the criminal justice
system and to deliberate in some of its workings. “Citizenry” in this
context is defined geographically and not necessarily by reference to
immigration law.
The American criminal justice system is supposed to be
fundamentally democratic; it should reflect an ideal of citizenship that is
equal, participatory, and deliberative. This Article is written from the
perspective of the citizens who participate as non-professionals in the
courts. Legal scholarship rarely considers the system from their
perspective.2 This is, to a certain extent, understandable because the
*
1. See Democratizing Criminal Justice Symposium, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367 (2017).
2. But see, e.g., Jenny Carroll, The Jury As Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 825 (2015)
(exploring “the critical interpretive role the jury plays within the democratic lawmaking body”);
Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173,
2175 (2014) (describing the essential constitutional role of the criminal court audience in
connecting the people to criminal procedure); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing As Democratic
Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 315–16 (2003) (making the case for jury sentencing based on
history, political legitimacy, deliberative democratic theory, and the practicalities of sentencing).
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criminal defendant in a given case has a higher stake than anyone in its
outcome. But society’s interest in the case is also great, and the criminal
justice system’s purposes go beyond sorting the guilty from the innocent,
respecting the rights of the accused, and imposing just punishment. The
criminal justice system must also meaningfully reflect self-rule by
citizens. That self-rule is central to the identity of the American people;
it is foundational to the Constitution that begins with the words “We the
People”; and it offers the best hope for a criminal justice system that
recognizes the inherent worth of the individual and the centrality of the
will of the people in any system that deserves to be called democratic.3
This Article’s theory of criminal justice citizenship is important
because it defines the role that citizens in a democracy ought to have in
administering criminal justice. Thus, the theory necessarily straddles the
line between legal and political theory: legal theory because it considers
the proper administration of criminal justice, and political theory because
it argues that criminal justice in a democracy must reflect a meaningful
degree of self-rule by citizens. This theory is novel in considering the
nature of citizenship in this country’s democracy and how that concept
ought to apply to criminal justice.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief history of
American criminal justice and discusses how the current system stacks
up against the normative ideal of democratic criminal justice. The
constitutional right to a trial by jury best reflects that ideal, although it
has largely disappeared. A group of scholars has recently revived the idea
of local, democratic criminal justice.
Part II sets forth a theory of citizenship drawn from political science
scholarship, focusing on membership, participation, and deliberation, and
applies this to criminal justice generally. Membership refers to who can
participate and whether they can participate on an equal basis. Where the
criminal justice system adheres to this principle, people enjoy a greater
sense of belonging, solidarity, and trust in government. Deliberation
refers to structured dialogues between lay persons, the content and
conclusions of which affect governmental decisions. Participation refers
to public participation in democratic processes, including jury service.
Institutions and procedures must be designed to give the people an
important role in government, but the nature and extent of that role are
limited by other considerations, such as procedural accuracy and
preventing racial discrimination.
Part III applies this theory to jury trials. The first key concept is
membership. Jury service, when it is inclusive, can broadly distribute
membership benefits in society. Citizens should have equal rights to serve
3. See Jocelyn Simonson, Essay, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 255–56 (2019).
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on juries, and all jurors should have an equal voice. When that condition
holds, the jury system can strengthen social solidarity, shore up the
governmental legitimacy, and help ensure criminal justice outcomes that
are fair and impartial.
The second key concept is deliberation. As applied to juries, it reveals
the need for many reforms. For example, because the public should be
able to deliberate on issues of major importance, it is clear that, when a
defendant in a criminal case faces potential deportation, that case is of
sufficient public importance that a jury should decide it. Furthermore,
because the deliberation process should be transparent to the public, trials
should be livestreamed or otherwise made publicly viewable, so that
people can gain a greater understanding of specific cases and criminal
adjudication generally.
Effective deliberations should be based on reason and a consideration
of all views presented. While juries reach the right conclusion most of the
time, many reforms are still needed. For example, jurors should be
allowed to take notes and ask questions throughout the trial, and the
voices of minority and female jurors need to be amplified.
The third key concept is participation. Jury service teaches people
hands-on about their own laws and government. Moreover, it helps
people work together for a common purpose and forges important social
connections. Unfortunately, many people would rather not take the time
for jury service. Society needs to give higher compensation to jurors and
make their service more convenient. Judges and attorneys need to respect
jurors’ time by streamlining trials as much as possible. Given the right
reforms, the trial jury—even in a system dominated by guilty pleas—can
be a strong vehicle for participatory self-government that respects equal
rights, promotes social solidarity and democratic legitimacy, and fosters
democratic deliberations.
Unfortunately, as plea bargaining has replaced jury trials, the system
has become too bureaucratized, and the people have been crowded out.
The solution to this has eluded policy makers. Re-enthroning the
eighteenth century jury trial is not feasible or even desirable,4 but merely
reforming plea bargaining to make it more fair and accurate for
defendants is not enough, either. The people need to have a more
significant role in criminal adjudication. The reasons for all this will
become clearer as this Article turns, first, to the history of the trial jury,
its demise, and the bureaucratic machinery that replaced it.

4. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 130 (2012).
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I. JURIES, PLEA BARGAINING, AND NON-DEMOCRATIC
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
One key feature of the American criminal justice system at the
Founding and as envisioned in the Constitution has been its local
orientation and democratic character.5 When left unchecked, it can be a
tool of oppression. But another set of pernicious problems can arise when
the system strays from its democratic roots.
A. Declining Juries and Bureaucratic Criminal Justice
The trial jury is an excellent example of a criminal procedure designed
not only to protect defendants’ rights—Colonial Americans trusted their
fellow citizens to adjudicate fairly more so than government
employees—but also to express and strengthen local citizenship.6 The
Constitution reflected this preference by enshrining the jury right in
Article III and the Sixth Amendment.7 Although modern judges, lawyers,
and scholars have typically treated this as a right belonging solely to
individual criminal defendants, the right was also originally conceived as
belonging primarily to the people.8
To describe this lofty theory of the jury trial is not to ignore its
downsides. While the local democratic character of Colonial-era juries
could be laudable, society would obviously never want to completely
replicate that institution in modern times. Colonial trials were quick,
relatively informal, and often inaccurate.9 Blacks, women, and other
marginalized groups could hardly hope for fair treatment at any stage of
the process.10 Local criminal justice reflected all the prejudices of the
local communities.11 Then, as now, juries have been known, due to
improper biases, to convict the innocent and acquit the guilty.12 Juries
5. See Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397,
398–99 (2009).
6. Id. at 414 (“In colonial America, decisions on criminal justice—and community
governance—trickled up.”).
7. Id. at 398 (first citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; and then citing id. amend. VI).
8. LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 13 (2015); Appleman, supra note 5, at 405, 440; see Laura I. Appleman,
Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1337–38 (2007); see also
ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS 12, 15 (2013) (explaining that the jury
is fundamental to rule by the people).
9. See Appleman, supra note 5, at 407.
10. See BIBAS, supra note 4, at 130.
11. Appleman, supra note 5, at 422–23.
12. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Defending the Jury: Crime, Community, and the Constitution,
CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. BOOKS (May 2016) (book review), https://clcjbooks.rutgers.edu/books/
defending-the-jury-crime-community-and-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/9REB-KSFG]
(discussing juries’ intuitions about punishment).
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have other weaknesses: as lay bodies, they can be unable to properly sort
through and weigh complicated or scientific evidence; they may also
struggle to apply key legal concepts like the presumption of innocence.
Finally, a jury has nearly unreviewable discretion to ignore the law in
particular cases.13
The American criminal justice system should not ignore these
problems, nor should it be blinded to the virtues of Colonial juries, which
the Colonists considered fairer in adjudicating than any outside body.14
Since then, the jury has long been considered, at least in theory, a
cornerstone of American criminal justice. But since Colonial times, jury
trials have almost entirely disappeared and been replaced by plea
bargaining.15 About 97% of federal convictions, and 95% of state
convictions, are obtained by guilty pleas.16 In plea bargaining, defendants
waive constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial, in exchange
for sentencing benefits that they likely would not receive if the case went
to trial.17 This form of non-trial disposition involves significantly less
procedural expense than trials and has been embraced by all the system’s
players.18
With the rise of plea bargaining came a different view of who held the
right to trial by jury. While judges through the mid-nineteenth century
saw the jury trial as a community-based right, later judges came to see it
as an individual—and therefore waivable—right.19 As more and more
defendants waived the right, the citizenry was left without its most
important constitutional means of participating in criminal adjudication.
The decline of the jury trial has upset the carefully balanced separation
of powers that should define the American system.20 Juries rarely have
the opportunity to decide cases, as by acquitting, convicting of the
charged or lesser crimes, or even nullifying. Judges rarely choose not to
accept plea agreements and have few legal grounds to review

13. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role
in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 65–69 (2006).
14. See J. R. Pole, Reflections on American Law and the American Revolution, 50 WM. &
MARY Q. 123, 132 (1993).
15. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 1 (2003).
16. Jenia I. Turner, Plea Bargaining, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 73, 73 n.2 (Erik
Luna ed., 2017).
17. See id. at 75–76.
18. See FISHER, supra note 15, at 17.
19. See Appleman, supra note 5, at 398.
20. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 1033–34 (2006); Daniel S. McConkie, Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery, 107 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (2017).
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prosecutorial charging discretion.21 The legislature has ceded great power
to prosecutors as well, by codifying crimes that prohibit an ever broader
swath of human conduct, have ever lower standards of mens rea for
prosecutors to prove, are effectively inchoate,22 and have mandatory
minimum penalties that greatly reduce judges’ and juries’ sentencing
discretion.23 Prosecutorial power has ballooned almost unchecked to the
point that prosecutors dominate the system.24 Prosecutors are largely
unaccountable to the people; prosecutors’ offices set their own priorities
and procedures, and citizens have only the blunt mechanism of elections
of chief prosecutors to control them.25 The inner workings of
prosecutorial offices, including charging decisions and plea bargaining,
are largely concealed from public view, leaving the public even more
powerless.26
The decline in jury trials has also changed the public’s view of them.
Most Americans will never have the opportunity to serve on a jury,27 and
this may be turning public attitudes against jury trials.28 Most people have
been persuaded that plea bargaining procedures generally save juries time
and the system money.29 But many members of the public also feel that
legal processes are opaque and confusing.30
B. Democratic Criminal Justice
An important critique of plea bargaining is that of overbureaucratization. Professor Joshua Kleinfeld, interpreting and applying
21. See Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 61, 69 (2015).
22. See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 227–30
(2007).
23. McConkie, supra note 20, at 8–9. One reason for this vast expansion of new crimes is
that legislatures have ceded their power to define crimes to administrative agencies. Brenner M.
Fissell, When Agencies Make Criminal Law, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 2).
24. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2123 (1998).
25. See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION, at xxv–xxviii (2019).
26. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 316; Turner, supra note 16, at 76.
27. Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 61
(1999).
28. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through
Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 354–55 (1999).
29. See, e.g., King, supra note 27, at 59–60, 67 (discussing incentives to avoid the “expense
of trial”).
30. Cf. Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Jury Reform for the 21st Century: A Judge’s Perspective,
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2005, at 32, 37–39 (describing instructions that should be given to juries to
assist them in understanding the law and the process of a trial before the trial begins).
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the work of sociologist Max Weber to criminal justice, has defined
bureaucracy as “a professionalized corps of officials and experts” that
governs through “technical expertise, knowledge, and general rules
applied to particular cases.”31 Bureaucrats govern through instrumental
rationality, through which “one identifies an end to be maximized and
uses the technical apparatus of government to secure that end as
efficiently as possible.”32 Bureaucracy has become so ubiquitous as to
become the defining feature of any modern democracy and even of
modernity itself.33
Bureaucracy brings certain advantages, such as efficiency, technical
accuracy, and the ability to apply predetermined rules to a large number
of cases in a theoretically evenhanded manner. For many challenges, the
advantages of relying on bureaucracies likely outweigh the
disadvantages. For example, one author, Professor Jason Brennan, has
recently argued for epistocracy (i.e., rule by the qualified) for
scientifically complex and slow-moving crises, like climate change.34
It is easy to see how criminal justice might be served by such a
philosophy.35 Criminal justice professionals embody it.36 Prosecutors try
to give the same “deal” for certain common categories of cases, especially
for quick dispositions, and defense attorneys and judges are usually quick
to come along.37 This allows them to process more cases more quickly
without becoming mired in individual complexities. Prosecutors and
judges endeavor to treat like cases alike.38 Many other experts—from
policy makers to parole officers—also provide scientific and technocratic
perspectives, which can benefit America’s large and complex criminal
justice system.
31. Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367,
1379 (2017) (emphasis omitted).
32. Id. at 1379 (noting that “bureaucratic government operates with a distinct conception of
what it means to be rational”). See generally Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy and
Criminal Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. 523 (2019) (discussing differing views of rationality of
criminal justice that exist within the bureaucracy).
33. See Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1379.
34. See Adam Tooze, Democracy and Its Discontents, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 6, 2019)
(citing JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY (2016)), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2019/06/06/democracy-and-its-discontents/ [https://perma.cc/Q6L7-WKL4].
35. See John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6–7) (arguing for diminished lay participation in
criminal justice and increased expert dominance).
36. See Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1396.
37. See Rappaport, supra note 35 (manuscript at 17–18) (“[M]ass-produced [plea] bargains
short-circuit elaborate constitutional procedures . . . .” (second alteration in original) (quoting
BIBAS, supra note 4, at xvi)).
38. See id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd 87

9
9/29/20 7:36 AM

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 5 [], Art. 2

1032

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Notwithstanding all this, bureaucracy has its downsides. First, it is
fundamentally non-democratic. Bureaucrats are only indirectly
accountable to the people.39 Their processes are opaque and difficult for
lay people to understand. One author has argued that the modern
bureaucracy itself is a “slow-moving existential challenge[]” against
which American democracy is ill-equipped to resist.40 Although
democracy requires some bureaucracy, it must also put in place
counterweights to bureaucratic forces, “pockets of resistance” where
outsiders to the bureaucracy can express their values and participate in
important processes.41
Second, bureaucracies do not do well at weighing competing values,
like justice and mercy, in individual cases. Weber called this “value
rationality” (the opposite of value instrumentality), which Kleinfeld
understood to mean making decisions “by consciously considering which
course of action best coheres with one’s own or the community’s ethos,
norms, or values, typically through attention to concrete particulars or a
concrete balancing of interests.”42 The common law method is based on
“concrete balancing of interests” and specializes in “concrete ethical or
other practical valuations.”43 But many prosecutors avoid this kind of
case-specific, local value-oriented thinking because it slows down the
“mill.”44 Furthermore, there is reason to be suspicious about whether
prosecutors, or any other professional criminal justice actors, are better
than the laity at certain kinds of decisions. Representative bodies of
citizens may do a better job, in some contexts, of representing community
values and equitably balancing competing interests. This would
effectively broaden the meaning of the term “expert” to include experts
in local values and conditions from the perspective of those who are
directly affected by, and interested in, criminal justice.45 In summary,
Kleinfeld argues that the root of America’s criminal justice crisis “is a set
of bureaucratic attitudes, structures, and incentives divorced from the
American public’s concerns and sense of justice.”46
39. See Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1382.
40. Tooze, supra note 34 (reviewing David Runciman’s book How Democracy Ends, a
work arguing that “[d]emocracy has no clear answer for the mindless operation of bureaucratic
and technological power”).
41. Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1383.
42. Id. at 1379.
43. Id. at 1381 (quoting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 891, 976 (Guenther Ross &
Claus Wittich eds. & trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922)).
44. See Rappaport, supra note 35 (manuscript at 17–18).
45. See Jocelyn Simonson, Power over Policing, BOSTON REV. (June 8, 2020),
http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/jocelyn-simonson-power-over-policing [https://perma.cc/
QWS5-JWTZ] (calling for shifting power from the police to communities).
46. Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1376.
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For this reason, Kleinfeld proposes that the system “preserve pockets
of nonbureaucratic reason and authority”—such as juries.47 He and a
group of other scholars recently proposed a solution to the divorce of
criminal justice from public concern and participation: “[M]ake criminal
justice more community focused and responsive to lay influences.”48 In
other words, the system must become less bureaucratic and more
democratic. According to Kleinfeld, the American criminal justice
system should “reflect and respond to the ethical life” of the citizenry.49
“Ethical life” refers to “the values disclosed by a community’s public
deliberations or implicit in its social practices and institutions, provided
those deliberations, practices, and institutions reflect or were formed in
reasonably non-oppressive conditions.”50 Kleinfeld proposes that the
criminal justice system “should be so structured that lay citizens take part
in it and see their sense of justice at work in it, rather than left wholly to”
the bureaucracy.51
To this end, scholars have put forth many concrete proposals to
democratize criminal justice at every stage of the process, including
adjudication proposals.52 These proposals have merit; while their
potential benefits for criminal defendants are important, scholars have not
yet closely examined how these proposals relate to, affect, and strengthen
citizenship. The concept of criminal justice citizenship considers the
public’s appropriate role in criminal justice and the benefits that may
accrue (in addition to procedural accuracy and fairness to defendants)
when this concept reassumes its fundamental place in American criminal
justice.
One key point that citizenship theory illuminates about Kleinfeld’s
critique of bureaucracy is the destructive effect of racism in criminal
justice. Kleinfeld calls over-bureaucratization the root of America’s
criminal justice crisis,53 but racism is indisputably also at the root.54
Although democracy can effectively counteract bureaucracy, racism has
long thrived under both orders. Thus, any proposed reform of criminal
justice that fails to address inequality will fall far short.55 Criminal justice
citizenship, as will be seen below, has equality and democracy at its heart.
47. Id. at 1381.
48. Id. at 1376.
49. Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
1455, 1466 (2017).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1457.
52. See, e.g., Joshua Kleinfeld et al., White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1693, 1693, 1701 (2017) (presenting thirty proposals for reform).
53. See supra text accompanying note 46.
54. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 1–2 (rev. ed. 2012).
55. The Author is indebted to his colleague, Brandon Evans, for this insight.
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II. CRIMINAL JUSTICE CITIZENSHIP
Much of the scholarship about the American criminal justice system
focuses on the rights of the accused. Other scholars have examined the
institutions that should safeguard these rights, such as the police,
prosecutors, judges, and juries. Less commonly addressed, however, is
the question of how these public functions fit into a democratic order and
what role ordinary citizens should play in them. Any proposed criminal
justice reform should not only help make the process fairer for criminal
defendants, but also allow for the exercise of citizenship to the extent
practicable in that context, recognizing that not all popular participation
necessarily serves the public good.
Common dictionary definitions of “citizen” and “citizenship” show
three popular yet divergent understandings of the terms. First, sometimes
“citizen” refers simply to “inhabitant.”56 Second, a citizen is a “member
of a state” who owes allegiance and is entitled to protection, or in other
words, that has both rights and duties.57 A third sense has to do with “the
quality of an individual’s response to membership in a community,”58 as
in Maya Angelou’s statement about the meaning of life: “I have a feeling
that I make a very good friend, and I’m a good mother, and a good sister,
and a good citizen. I am involved in life itself—all of it. And I have a lot
of energy and a lot of nerve.”59 This Article uses the term consistently
with all three of those meanings, although it emphasizes the political.
This Article focuses on citizenship in the United States (including states
and localities), which is a distinct product of its history, legal tradition,
and Constitution. Even still, the discussion that follows is more normative
than descriptive.60
Citizenship is the basis of America’s political (and thus, to an extent,
social) order. In the joint enterprise of self-government, it encompasses
56. Citizen, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/citizen
[https://perma.cc/P7SJ-2TE6]. This definition often connotes entitlement to certain rights and
privileges. Id.
57. Id.
58. Citizenship, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/citizenship
[https://perma.cc/7GVV-2Q3M].
59. Marianne Schnall, Exclusive Interview with Maya Angelou on Her New Book, Mom &
Me & Mom, HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2013, 9:23 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
maya-angelou-mothers-day-book_b_3202362 [https://perma.cc/2FUK-H8U2] (last updated Dec.
6, 2017); see also Theodore Roosevelt, The Duties of American Citizenship (Jan. 26, 1883),
https://glc.yale.edu/duties-american-citizenship [https://perma.cc/A63P-YEXX] (“The first duty
of an American citizen, then, is that he shall work in politics; his second duty is that he shall do
that work in a practical manner; and his third is that it shall be done in accord with the highest
principles of honor and justice.”).
60. One descriptive definition of American citizenship is simply “a shared set of
expectations about the citizen’s role in politics.” Russell J. Dalton, Citizenship Norms and the
Expansion of Political Participation, 56 POL. STUD. 76, 78 (2008) (emphasis omitted).
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the people’s rights and freedoms, duties and responsibilities, and
relationships to each other. Political scientists have demonstrated that
democratic citizenship is based on three closely related key concepts:
(1) Membership. This refers formally to who is a citizen and
who is not, but the quality of membership varies by degrees.
(Formerly incarcerated persons, for example, may have legal
limits on their abilities to act as citizens; furthermore, they
are often stigmatized.) These questions require consideration
of the related concepts of civic equality (including equal
rights and duties), a sense of belonging, solidarity (shared
commitment to social order), and legitimacy (acceptance of
state authority).
(2) Participation. This refers to public participation in
democratic processes, such as jury service and voting.
(3) Deliberation. This refers to three related concepts:
participation in democratic deliberations (as by speaking and
listening), becoming sufficiently informed about the issues,
and understanding others’ views.61
Criminal justice citizenship connects these three principles of
citizenship to criminal justice and considers their application to specific
contexts. Thus, a criminal justice citizen is anyone in a jurisdiction
(municipal, state, or federal) who has membership there, meaning that
she is subject to its criminal laws and its processes and is protected, at
least theoretically, by those laws and processes; a criminal justice citizen
is able, through participation or deliberation, to exert influence over those
laws and processes. We the People are all criminal justice citizens. The
question is, in what contexts and to what extent is the common good
served by popular participation in criminal justice? This Article wrestles
with these issues in the context of the jury trial.
The link between citizenship and criminal justice is underexamined.62 Rather, scholars have focused more attention on the link
between citizenship and democracy63 and between democracy and the
criminal justice system.64 This is unfortunate because citizenship
describes a critical, distinctive, and historical aspect of American
democracy from the perspective of those who participate. Without a clear
61. See, e.g., RICHARD BELLAMY, CITIZENSHIP 12 (2008); Dalton, supra note 60, at 78–79.
62. But see DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND MASS INCARCERATION (Albert W. Dzur et al. eds.,
2016) (providing a collection of essays discussing democratic participation in criminal justice).
63. Political scientists have taken a much greater interest in this than legal academics. See,
e.g., COMMUNITY AS THE MATERIAL BASIS OF CITIZENSHIP (Rodolfo Rosales ed., 2017); BARBARA
CRUIKSHANK, THE WILL TO EMPOWER (1999); CLIFF ZUKIN ET AL., A NEW ENGAGEMENT?:
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, CIVIC LIFE, AND THE CHANGING AMERICAN CITIZEN (2006).
64. See, e.g., Democratizing Criminal Justice Symposium, supra note 1.
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understanding of how citizenship relates to America’s criminal justice
system, any understanding of that system is impoverished. This leads to
the danger of assuming (1) that the criminal justice system, without
significant democratic elements, actually represents the will of the
people; (2) that the criminal justice system can properly and legitimately
function without effective mechanisms for the people to meaningfully
chart its course and even to operate it in appropriate circumstances; and
(3) that a citizenry that does not participate in the criminal justice system
will have strong “habits of freedom,” such as participation in politics,
deliberation, and the desire to seek the common good,65 necessary to a
healthy democratic society. Thus, criminal justice citizenship,
comprising principles of membership, participation, and deliberation,
should be considered integral to criminal justice in American democracy.
A. Membership
Membership, the first ideal of citizenship, generally refers to one’s
belonging to the political community as an equal and having a sense of
that belonging.66 It also requires a commitment to a particular social
order, including solidarity with other citizens and a belief that the
government is legitimate.67 As applied to criminal justice citizenship,
membership is an important criterion for judging the current system or
any proposed reforms. For example, popular participation as a democratic
practice must not overpower the imperative of equal protection under the
law.
1. Equality
Membership implies equality. Citizenship requires “a condition of
civic equality” and “consists of membership of a political community
where all citizens can determine the terms of social cooperation on an
equal basis.”68 One way to measure civic equality is the “eyeball test,”
which holds that citizens must be willing and able to “look others in the
eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of interference

65. See Yuval Levin, Taking the Long Way: Disciplines of the Soul Are the Basis of a
Liberal Society, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2014, at 25, 30.
66. See BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 52.
67. See infra Section II.A.3.
68. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 17 (“This status not only secures equal rights to the
enjoyment of the collective goods provided by the political association but also involves equal
duties to promote and sustain them . . . .”); see also Lauren Gilbert, Citizenship, Civic Virtue, and
Immigrant Integration: The Enduring Power of Community-Based Norms, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 335, 339 (2009) (discussing theoretical perspectives on citizenship, membership, and
belonging).
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might inspire.”69 Ideally, this civic equality is a necessary precondition
for citizenship.
In practice, of course, Americans’ ability to participate or deliberate
as criminal justice citizens is not equally distributed. For example, aliens
and felons generally cannot vote or serve on juries.70 Still, they have other
opportunities to participate, as by speaking out in public forums. More
broadly, people of color, poor people, and people with less education are
less likely to participate in any way in the criminal justice system. 71 This
asymmetry arises from social inequality and can be expected to skew the
benefits of criminal justice citizenship away from the less privileged and
in favor of those who can and do participate. Thus, criminal justice
citizenship requires the justice system to be actively inclusive in the
participation it seeks.
The American conception of equality in citizenship draws heavily
from Ancient Rome.72 Roman citizenship centered on equality under the
law.73 The Roman Republic was characterized by competing classes, and
it institutionalized a system of checks and balances to restrain them.74
Citizens participated so that their self-interests and group interests could
be weighed more heavily in the balances against those of competing
groups.75 It was thought that the public interest would emerge from such
a system.76 Modern theories of citizenship have likewise drawn on this
model of balancing competing group interests.77 Nevertheless, one
criticism of Roman citizenship is that it had an “instrumental,” or selfish,
character, in contrast to “the Greek ideal of disinterested service to the
public good.”78
Citizens in a democracy must view each other as moral equals. Moral
equality does not imply that citizens value the conduct or opinions of
others as equal to their own but rather that they actually view each other
as fundamentally equal before the law, deserving of its protection, and
69. R.A. Duff & S.E. Marshall, Civic Punishment, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND MASS
INCARCERATION, supra note 62, at 33, 35 (quoting PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS 84
(2012)).
70. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial
Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 279 (2007) (“The most
obvious way in which mass incarceration bars black democratic participation is the impact of
felon disenfranchisement.”).
71. See id. at 282.
72. See BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 38.
73. See id. at 34–35.
74. See id. at 35–38.
75. Id. at 38.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 36–38; see infra Section II.B.1.
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comprising an integral part of the polity.79 This is related to but distinct
from formal legal equality, which can be enshrined in the law and even
enforced, to some extent, by the state. A widely held conception of moral
equality is necessary to citizenship because citizens who do not believe
that those belonging to less powerful groups are of equal moral worth
might, by their deliberations and participation, erode that equality. (Think
racist juries or racist electorates, for example.) This marginalizes certain
groups to the detriment of the democracy for which many Americans
strive.80
Furthermore, equality on the local level is a key concern of criminal
justice citizenship. Because local officials handle most criminal cases,
most opportunities for citizens to participate in criminal justice are local,
too. Therefore, this Article focuses on local citizenship.81 In a very large
and diverse society, local criminal justice promotes citizenship. It is
generally easier for a smaller group of people to work out solutions to
their own problems than a much larger group. A locality can provide
many opportunities for its citizens to participate in government, to
deliberate together, to listen to each other, and to consider each other’s
interests.82 In a smaller locality, there will typically be a narrower range
of disputes and acceptable solutions.83 The flip side is, as the history of
the Civil Rights Movement demonstrates, that the national government
must guarantee a baseline of civil rights.84
It is true that people often think of citizenship as U.S. citizenship.85
But even non-U.S. citizens are criminal justice citizens where they live.
The criminal justice system, with its close ties to the machinery of
deportation, has an outsized impact in their communities. Non-U.S.
citizens have a few ways, albeit limited, to participate, such as by
79. Cf. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 105 (arguing that a referendum fails to meet the standard
of citizenship if the referendum does not encourage “participants to view each other as equals”).
80. See id. at 96. President George Washington warned against “the first dawning of every
attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties” that
unite us. George Washington, President, U.S., Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-00963 [https://perma.cc/5YA5CZBK]. Of course, though Washington eloquently articulated this ideal, he was a slaveholder who
did not fully comprehend it.
81. For a discussion of local citizenship, see Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and
Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 574 (2010). “[T]he concept of citizenship as one
only bounded by national borders has long given way to the recognition that there are other
places—both outside and within the nation-state—where citizenship is also located.” Id.
82. Of course, every locality does it differently, and some do it better than others.
83. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 104.
84. See id. at 79.
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.”).
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engaging in political protests or deliberating in community councils.
Because they should be equally protected by the criminal law and its
processes, non-U.S. citizens should have expanded opportunities to
participate.86
2. Belonging and Feeling of Belonging
Membership depends on more than actually belonging to the group. It
also depends on a feeling of belonging, a sense of inclusion in the larger
society, such that one’s voice is considered and one’s participation makes
a difference. Where people lack this sense of inclusion, they may be less
likely to participate.87 For example, marginalized groups are less likely
to vote or serve on a jury than those that are not marginalized.88
Nevertheless, there may be good reasons to exclude someone from
certain privileges. A few examples might include not letting sixteen-yearolds or incarcerated felons vote. A more controversial example is
excluding certain groups from juries for cause, like those who distrust all
police or categorically oppose the death penalty. Whenever a group is
excluded from participation, there is a social cost. Although such
instances may sometimes be unavoidable, care must be taken so that those
who are excluded in one context still have and are aware of substantial
opportunities to participate in other ways.
3. Solidarity
Membership requires sufficient solidarity among the citizenry to
create a sense of a “shared civic project.” People who self-identify as
citizens of a particular jurisdiction may “increasingly view the well-being
of the [polity] as central to their own identity and work on behalf of the
86. Cf. Chloe Veltman & Vanessa Rancaño, Noncitizens Allowed to Vote in S.F. School
Board Election, but Few Will, KQED NEWS (Nov. 6, 2018, 10:30 AM),
https://www.kqed.org/news/11680868/voter-registration-for-non-citizens-begins-in-s-f-schoolboard-election [https:// perma.cc/2CC5-G3KX] (“San Francisco became the largest city in the
United States to allow noncitizens to vote in a local election today—but few newly enfranchised
residents were ready to take the city up on the offer.”).
87. See, e.g., LEONIE HUDDY ET AL., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
739 (2013); Univ. Ctr. for the Advancement of Teaching, Sense of Belonging in the College
Classroom, OHIO ST. U., https://ucat.osu.edu/bookshelf/teaching-topics/shaping-a-positivelearning-environment/sense-of-belonging-in-the-college-classroom/ [https://perma.cc/R2EG-KQJY]
(explaining that college students who lack a feeling of belonging are less likely to participate in
class).
88. See HUDDY ET AL., supra note 87, at 745; Nacente S. Seabury, Diversity Matters:
Confronting Implicit Bias with Jury Diversity, A.B.A. (Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.americanbar
.org/groups/litigation/comittees/commercial-business/practice/2016/diversity-matters-confrontingimplicit-bias-jury-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/S8LW-PY76]. Although jury service is technically
compulsory, it is well-known that there are ways to get out of it.
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[polity].”89 A common cause unifies the citizenry and helps it work
together.90 Critics rightly fear an oppressive, all-embracing
communitarianism, but social solidarity does not require this. As
Professor R.A. Duff argued,
[T]he civic enterprise is just one of many communities, one
of many forms of life, that structure our lives: its scope and
reach is limited, partly because a central feature of that form
of life in a liberal republic is its emphasis on individual
freedom and the privacy that it requires.91
Ancient Athenians, at least as modern society idealizes them, enjoyed
solidarity in their small, homogeneous society. The citizens of Athens
enjoyed “civic friendship”: they knew each other, shared common values
and interests, and could agree on civic matters.92 This is obviously not
replicable in modern society. Indeed, it did not actually exist in Athens,
where women, slaves, and outsiders were treated deplorably.93 Still, some
basic agreement about major issues is necessary in a democracy, and this
limited solidarity seems more achievable on the local level. Citizens who
know each other personally and interact in many contexts are more likely
to tolerate each other’s differences and even take them into account in
policy making.94
In America, the Constitution is a major source of political solidarity,
setting ground rules upon which society must agree.95 Its preamble
expresses unity (“We the People . . .”) and shared purposes, such as peace,

89. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of
Procedural Justice, 123 YALE L.J. F. 525, 544 (2014).
90. See BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 34.
91. R.A. Duff, A Criminal Law for Citizens, 14 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 293, 301
(2010).
92. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 34.
93. See SARAH B. POMEROY ET AL., ANCIENT GREECE: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL
HISTORY 118–20, 382 (4th ed. 2018).
94. See, e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY
SELECTION 47, 50 (2010), https://eji.org/reports/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection
[https://perma.cc/5XJN-KFCS]; supra text accompanying note 90; see also BELLAMY, supra note
61, at 34 (stating that Greek citizens took each other’s concerns into account in public decisionmaking).
95. See Amy Chua & Jed Rubenfeld, The Threat of Tribalism, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/the-threat-of-tribalism/568342/ [https://
perma.cc/N2PV-ECLU]; see also Kleinfeld, supra note 49, at 1459 n.6 (explaining John Rawls’s
argument that, in a liberal society, “all [citizens] affirm the political conception of a constitutional
regime” (quoting JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xviii (1993))). Of course, the
Constitution itself is up for debate and can be amended, but only with great difficulty.
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justice, and advancing the general welfare.96 However, citizenship, as it
is lived out, is much more personal than law can dictate. Citizenship
encompasses social relationships, and the way people think about each
other and treat each other is not solely dependent on law. Solidarity
cannot be imposed by higher authorities; it has to be felt on the grassroots
level. The culture and character of the people in a particular jurisdiction,
the way they see each other and treat each other, are all reflected in their
political activities and their exercise of citizenship.97 For example, these
cultural characteristics manifest in any jury that happens to be formed,
and prosecutors and defense attorneys take them into account throughout
the case and in jury selection.98 The same could be said for how culture
and character influence how citizens cast their ballots.
Solidarity is an important concept in criminal justice. At its best, the
criminal law represents a common enterprise based on shared values.
Those who act out against those values should be dealt with but not
permanently excluded (except perhaps in the most egregious cases) from
the polity.99 Criminal law is not simply Us administering justice to Them;
it is Us administering justice to Ourselves.100 Punishment should aim to
preserve, to the extent possible, the offender’s civic standing and
reintegrate the offender—a fellow citizen—into the polity.101
4. Legitimacy
Finally, membership must include recognizing the government’s
legitimacy as a center of power and “broad acceptance of the legitimacy
of the prevailing rules of politics.”102 Citizens are more likely to view law
as legitimate if it reflects the will of the people in some meaningful way,
and if its burdens and benefits are equitably distributed. Citizens who are
96. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to [1] form a more
perfect Union, [2] establish Justice, [3] insure domestic Tranquility, [4] provide for the common
defence, [5] promote the general Welfare, and [6] secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”
(emphasis added)).
97. See Dalton, supra note 60, at 79 (defining citizenship more broadly to include one’s
relationship with others in the polity and an ethical and moral responsibility toward them).
98. See, e.g., John Kifner, Bronx Juries: A Defense Dream, a Prosecution Nightmare, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1988, § B, at 1 (explaining that an “overwhelmingly black and Hispanic” jury in
the Bronx is likely to have a different relationship with police officers than a white jury in
Westchester).
99. See Duff, supra note 91, at 301.
100. See id. at 302 (“[W]e must ask not what kinds of punishment ‘we’ should impose on
‘them’, [sic] but what kinds of punishment we should impose on ourselves . . . .”).
101. Id. at 302–03.
102. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 13 (“[T]he nature of that participation and the capabilities
it calls for have varied over time and remain matters of debate.”).
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the law’s “agents, not merely its obedient subjects,” will respect the law
and be willing to play an active role in the civic enterprise.103
As applied to the criminal justice system, legitimacy is critical
because there is evidence to suggest that “the perceived legitimacy of the
source of authority may be more significant to [citizens’ decisions to
comply with the law]—and, thus, to the legal system's ability to control
crime—than to the penalties imposed for non-compliance.”104
Furthermore, people must perceive that the justice system is accurate if it
is “to command the respect and confidence of the community.”105
Lastly, participation brings increased legitimacy.106 The general
public already generally trusts career government agency employees as a
group107 including criminal justice professionals. (However, Blacks are
much less likely to trust the police than non-Hispanic Whites.)108 But
when lay people participate in the criminal process, they believe it is even
fairer.109
B. Participation
Participation refers to self-government or government by the
people.110 Participation builds on membership because citizens must be
able to define and determine the terms of social cooperation on an equal
basis.111

103. Duff & Marshall, supra note 69, at 36.
104. Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 143, 163 (2011). Professor Tom Tyler has written extensively about concern for “procedural
justice” and people’s perception of whether criminal procedures are fair. See id. at 162 (citing
Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychological
Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 663–64 (2007)). This perception
depends on whether they are able to present their own case and have a voice in the process;
whether they perceive the adjudicator to be neutral, that is, applying legal principles consistently
to the facts of the case; “whether they are treated with dignity and politeness”; and the cues they
can discern about the intentions of the authorities. Id.
105. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
106. See Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 949 (2006).
107. How Americans See Problems of Trust, PEW RES. CTR. (July 22, 2019),
https://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/how-americans-see-problems-of-trust/
[https://perma.cc/254J-GSXX]. About 61% of survey respondents had “at least a fair amount of
confidence in these individuals to act in the best interests of the public.” Id.
108. Id.
109. Bibas, supra note 106, at 929 & n.75.
110. Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1390; see also Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 726–33 (2001) (describing the theory of participatory democracy).
111. See BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 16–17.
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1. The History and Theory of American Citizenship
American citizenship can be traced back even further than Ancient
Rome, to the Ancient Greeks and classical republicanism. The word
“democracy” itself comes from Greek roots meaning “people” and
“rule.”112 For the Greeks, democracy meant that citizens participated
fully in government. The Greeks’ emphasis on participation contrasts
sharply with Roman citizenship, which focused on equality.113 Aristotle
argued that a person could not attain his full potential outside the polis.114
Citizenship was strictly limited to free males, and their duties included
serving on juries, on local assemblies and councils, and in the military.115
As with Ancient Rome, moderns can find plenty to criticize about
Ancient Greece. Athens was doubly oppressive: first, it was built on the
backs of women, slaves, and non-citizens; and second, it subordinated all
private interests to those of the state.116 Still, it is indisputable that citizens
in ancient Athens exercised a great degree of self-government.
Furthermore, this ideal greatly influenced the Founding Fathers.117
Civic participation in American society has some roots in another
Roman ideal, the classical republican conception of the common good.118
Republicanism requires active participation in civic affairs and putting
the common good ahead of personal interests.119 Many of the Founders
spoke in republican terms. For example, in Federalist no.10, James
Madison argued that a republican system of government “refine[s] and
enlarge[s] the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest
of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”120 In other

112. Id. at 98.
113. Id. at 38–39.
114. Id. at 31.
115. Id. at 31–33.
116. Id. at 35.
117. See THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 32–33 (London, W.T. Sherman 1817) (“What
Athens was in miniature, America will be in magnitude.”).
118. See FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 66–68. This is not the only idea of the American
Founding but it was an important one. See id. at 67–68; see also Paul Meany, Why the Founding
Fathers Loved Ancient Rome, MEDIUM (Oct. 30, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/romes-heroesand-america-s-founding-fathers-6dada32a8885 [https://perma.cc/U5W4-TQJB] (discussing how
Cicero and Cato inspired the Founding Fathers).
119. See FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 67 (describing Thomas Paine’s undestanding of
republicanism); see also Republicanism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 4, 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/ [https://perma.cc/PS8E-AUL3] (discussing
writers who emphasize the need for civic virtue and political participation).
120. FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 70 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)).
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words, citizens who participated in government121 with the greater good
in mind could democratically represent the best interests of the people
without trampling minority rights.122
Similarly, the common good is an important theme of the
Constitution.123 The Preamble’s first words are “We the People,” and its
purposes include “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity.”124 Furthermore, the Constitution created many connecting
points of civic life intended to network the people physically,
economically, and socially. These included regulation of interstate and
international commerce, a common currency, post offices and post roads,
the collection of taxes, a common military defense, and uniform
bankruptcy laws.125 The jury was, and still is, another one of those
connecting points.126
Citizens in America today still have many ways to participate in the
connecting points of civic life. Perhaps the key feature of democratic
participation is voting in regular elections decided by a majority.127 There
are many other ways to serve, like sitting on a jury, participating in
advisory boards, running for elected office, paying taxes, giving military
service, working for the public sector, engaging in political protests, and
performing community service. Former General Stanley McChrystal has
advocated a year of compulsory national service for young people ages
eighteen through twenty-eight to invigorate citizenship and foster greater
social cohesion, arguing that “[c]ivic participation grants a sense of
ownership to citizens.”128
In his farewell speech on January 10, 2017, President Barack Obama
argued that the Constitution is a dead letter without the people’s
participation and that the most important office in a democracy is that of

121. Madison was referring to legislators, but part of what he said can also apply to jurors.
122. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM 262 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988); see also Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate
Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 804 (1993) (arguing that no one group
of citizens, including a group of experts, can be trusted with government forever).
123. FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 69.
124. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
125. FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 70–72.
126. Id. at 72.
127. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 109. The United States has never fully embraced the
seemingly obvious principle that these elections should also be based on the principle of one
person, one vote.
128. Stanley McChrystal, Securing the American Character, DEMOCRACY J. (2014),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/33/securing-the-american-character/ [https://perma.cc/
F487-NBPR].
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the citizen.129 He spoke of the need to rebuild democratic institutions and
argued that doing so:
[D]epends on our participation; on each of us accepting the
responsibility of citizenship . . . .
Our Constitution is a remarkable, beautiful gift. But it’s
really just a piece of parchment. It has no power on its own.
We, the people, give it power. We, the people, give it
meaning[] [w]ith our participation . . . .130
Similarly, Supreme Court Justice Steven Breyer has argued that “the
Constitution’s efforts to create democratic political institutions mean
little unless the public participates in American political life.”131
Discourse about American citizenship tends to favor individual rights,
which can be defined as entitlements or individual claims that are made
upon others or the government.132 Likewise, criminal justice scholars
have focused on the rights of the accused.133 But one point that is not
often made is that rights must be “constructed and sustained by the
activities of citizens.”134 The strength of citizenship and its associated
rights depends on the degree to which citizens “regard themselves as
involved in shaping their relationships with each other and the state
through their ability to influence the rules, policies, and politicians that
govern social life.”135 In other words, in the American system, rights,
participation, and membership must go together. Rights are not selfexecuting or solely dependent upon government officials and
bureaucrats: they can only flourish amidst general conditions of equality,
solidarity, and mass participation in government.136
In spite of citizen participation’s key role in sustaining America’s
criminal justice system, it is much less examined than rights, at least in
the law reviews. There are many ways that citizens currently participate
in criminal justice, and reformers are working to expand the avenues for
doing so. Some are direct and powerful (e.g., jury service); others are

129. Barack Obama, President, U.S., Farewell Address (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/farewell [https://perma.cc/M9FZ-7WDA].
130. Id.
131. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 215 (2010).
132. See BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 14.
133. See, e.g., Duff & Marshall, supra note 69, at 38–39 (“[A]n important dimension of the
criminal law . . . in a democratic republic, [is that] citizens will be active participants in the civic
enterprise, including the enterprise of criminal law.”).
134. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 25.
135. Id.
136. See id.
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more indirect but still promise important benefits (e.g., advisory boards
to police and prosecutors).137
Some may object that in a modern and complex society, turning over
a function so important and difficult to the laity is unwise. Why should
criminal justice be designated as one of the rare pockets of resistance to
the bureaucracy?138 In the first place, citizens consistently “show
passionate interest in how insiders handle it.”139 This makes participation
in criminal justice a matter of democratic legitimacy. Relatedly, the
stakes of criminal justice are unusually high and personal, both for
defendants and society.140 Crime represents a tearing of the social fabric,
and it affects everyone in some way. Consequently, the system should
help to re-stitch the social fabric, benefitting not just defendants or
victims but also the larger community. Second, as previously discussed,
non-professional citizens are more likely to employ value rationality than
instrumental rationality in criminal justice, and a certain measure of this
is beneficial.141 Third, as previously discussed, public participation in
criminal justice is inherent and essential to America’s constitutional
order.142
2. Benefits of Participation
Citizens can expect to enjoy several benefits from their participation
in government, including denser social networks (referred to as social
capital), shared legal and ethical standards, and firsthand knowledge of
the workings of government.
i. Social and Individual Benefits
Where citizens participate in the machinery of government, they have
opportunities to create and strengthen relationships with their fellow
citizens, whether they volunteer in the community or at the polls or serve
on a jury or advisory board. The theory of social capital describes the
137. The key issue in communitarianism is representation. See David Schuman, Taking Law
Seriously: Communitarian Search and Seizure, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 583, 590 & n.30 (1990)
(“Even with decentralization and increased localism, our world, as opposed to earlier worlds or
utopian ones, cannot be restructured to allow meaningful direct participation.”).
138. See Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1383.
139. Bibas, supra note 109, at 915 & n.9 (describing rational apathy as voter indifference
toward becoming informed or voting in general because it is unlikely that doing so would
personally benefit the voter).
140. Id. at 915.
141. See supra Section I.B.
142. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (giving citizens the right to a trial by jury); id. amend.
VI (same). But see Bibas, supra note 109, at 915 (describing victims, witnesses, and citizens as
having few procedural rights in a criminal case).
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benefits of these relationships.143 Social capital has been defined as “the
aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.”144 Social capital
can accrue inside or outside of government. Indeed, governmental
institutions can create social capital and trust,145 and without strong state
institutions, Hobbesian social chaos may prevail.146 As it relates to
criminal justice citizenship, social capital can accrue through
participation in many different activities, from community boards to
juries to political organizing to protesting.147
Professor Robert Putnam, a pioneer in this field, includes in his
definition of social capital both “social networks and the associated
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness.”148 These networks, as
described famously in Putnam’s Bowling Alone, “increase the
productivity of individuals and groups in the community.”149 Social
capital helps communities because it creates social understanding and
encourages local, mutually advantageous solutions.150 It also increases
people’s empathy for one another.151 “[S]ocial capital makes us smarter,

143. Edward Fieldhouse & David Cutts, Does Diversity Damage Social Capital? A
Comparative Study of Neighbourhood Diversity and Social Capital in the US and Britain, 43
CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 289, 290 (2010).
144. Id. (quoting Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND
RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241, 248 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986)).
145. Margaret Levi, Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s
Making Democracy Work, 24 POL. & SOC’Y 45, 50 (1996).
146. Id. at 50 (discussing Yugoslavia and Lebanon as famous examples); see also Jean L.
Cohen, American Civil Society Talk, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL 55, 60–
61 (Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1999) (analyzing Robert Putnam’s theory of social capital); Peter
Levine, Bowling Alone After (Almost) 20 Years, PETER LEVINE: BLOG FOR CIVIC RENEWAL (Feb.
18, 2014) https://peterlevine.ws/?p=13329 [https://perma.cc/2NGM-KEG7] (mentioning both
Putnam’s and Cohen’s arguments). The Seventeenth Century English philosopher Thomas Hobbs
argued in LEVIATHAN that mankind had been in a state of nature, which was a war of “all against
all,” and that absolute sovereign was necessary to provide protection to the people. Sharon A.
Lloyd and Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(Spring
2019
ed.),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/hobbes-moral/
[https://perma.cc/VNL2RCGP] (last updated Apr. 18, 2018).
147. See, e.g., Stephen Abbott, Social Capital and Health: The Role of Participation, 8 SOC.
THEORY & HEALTH 51, 58 (2010) (identifying and distinguishing several forms of participation).
148. Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first
Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 137 (2007).
149. FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 74 (citing ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 19 (2000)).
150. Id. at 74–75 (citing PUTNAM, supra note 148, at 288).
151. Id. at 75 (citing PUTNAM, supra note 148, at 288–89).
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healthier, safer, richer, and better able to govern a just and stable
democracy.”152
There is evidence that social capital in America, by some measures, is
declining. One report by the Senate Joint Economic Committee found
that, as compared with the past, there is less voting amongst people of
voting age; people spend less time with their neighbors in their
community; union membership and involvement are declining; church
affiliation and attendance are declining; and wealthy and poorer
communities are economically segregating, which in turn hinders
community organizing in poorer communities.153 Other research shows
that America is in the midst of a “Loneliness Epidemic.”154
It is true that increasing social capital is not inherently good. Stronger
social connections among particular subgroups do not always serve
society’s best interests.155 For example, Timothy McVeigh and other coconspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing were members of a bowling
league; this is a case where it may have been better to bowl alone.156 The
same can be said for communities of extremists like 8chan that network
and support each other online.157
Furthermore, the benefits of social capital are not evenly distributed.
They tend to skew away from society’s least privileged groups. 158 The
theory of social capital has often failed to sufficiently consider the
experience of marginalized communities,159 and “the historical reality of
152. Id. (quoting PUTNAM, supra note 148, at 290).
153. VICE CHAIRMAN’S STAFF JOINT ECON. COMM., WHAT WE DO TOGETHER 3–4, 34, 49
(2017), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/b5f224ce-98f7-40f6-a814-8602696714d
8/what-we-do-together.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRR6-Y5WW].
154. The “Loneliness Epidemic,” HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.,
https://www.hrsa.gov/enews/past-issues/2019/january-17/loneliness-epidemic [https://perma.cc/
Q3KD-ZELU]. “Two in five Americans report that they sometimes or always feel their social
relationships are not meaningful, and one in five say they feel lonely or socially isolated. The lack
of connection can have life threatening consequences . . . .” Id. (quoting Professor Julianne HoltLunstad); see also Nicholas Kristof, Let’s Wage a War on Loneliness, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/09/opinion/sunday/britain-loneliness-epidemic.html [https://
perma.cc/8MTD-XJHF] (comparing British and American responses to mass loneliness).
155. Elinor Ostrom, Investing in Capital, Institutions, and Incentives, in INSTITUTIONS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 153, 162 (Christopher Clague ed., 1997) (acknowledging that “[s]ocial
capital can also have a dark side”).
156. Fareed Zakaria, Bigger than the Family, Smaller than the State, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1995, § 7, at 1.
157. See Timothy McLaughlin, The Weird, Dark History of 8chan, WIRED (Aug. 6, 2019,
6:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-weird-dark-history-8chan/ [https://perma.cc/G9BL2VSL].
158. See Patrick T. Brown, The Dark Side of Social Capital, NAT’L AFF., Summer 2019, at
106, 106–07.
159. Irene Bloemraad, Book Review, 33 CANADIAN J. SOC. 439, 439 (2008) (reviewing
BARBARA ARNEIL, DIVERSE COMMUNITIES: THE PROBLEM WITH SOCIAL CAPITAL (2006)).
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exclusion, assimilation and eradication in the civic life of America.”160
These communities may not be able to draw on the same “historical
accumulation” of social capital as dominant groups.161
Notwithstanding these drawbacks to social capital, it seems
reasonable that greater public participation in criminal justice could
strengthen communal ties in positive and inclusive ways. Several avenues
for reform involve citizens at many stages of the criminal process, like
protest movements (e.g., Black Lives Matter), citizen advisory boards,
and juries. These reforms could provide many citizens with opportunities
to work together for the common good.162 Participating in the criminal
justice system should help citizens to become personally invested in local
criminal justice issues, which could spur further reform. These same
people who personally participate in criminal justice and are energized
by the experience may choose to exercise their citizenship in other ways,
such as by voting or becoming involved in other civic activities.163
There is evidence that participation in civic activity, broadly defined
to “include voting, volunteering, participating in group activities, and
community gardening,” produces better health outcomes and pro-social
behavior.164 For example, voting is associated with better self-reported
health outcomes, and choosing not to vote is associated with poorer
reported health.165 Another major study of civic involvement concluded
that adults who were civically involved had “greater self-esteem and
better personal relationships,” “fewer illnesses, lower levels of
depression,” and longer lives.166 Civic engagement benefits the wider
society, too. “States and countries with greater proportions of civically
engaged citizens have lower rates of disease, mental illness, and suicide.
They, too, have lower crime rates, as well as having greater economic
prosperity, better-educated children, and more effective governments.”167
Additionally, a national study using longitudinal data of late teens and
early adults found that those who had engaged in voting and volunteering
160. Id. at 441 (quoting ARNEIL, supra note 159, at 211).
161. Id. at 439.
162. Each reform has different costs and benefits and deserves separate consideration, but
this Article focuses only on the jury.
163. See FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 75–76.
164. Civic Participation, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2020, https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/
topics-objectives/topic/social-determinants-health/interventions-resources/civic-participation
[https://perma.cc/TC88-284E].
165. Id.
166. S. Mark Pancer & Sally Hussey, The Psychology of Citizenship and Civic Engagement,
BANG THE TABLE BLOG (May 13, 2016), https://www.bangthetable.com/blog/psychology-ofcitizenship-and-civic-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/DJ6Z-WGAL] (summarizing Pancer’s own
book, The Psychology of Citizenship and Civic Engagement).
167. Id.
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had higher levels of income and educational attainment down the line, as
well as better mental health and general health outcomes.168 Another
study “found that eighth-graders who had been involved in community
service” (voluntarily or not) were almost twice as likely to graduate from
college than their peers who had not.169 Another study focusing on urban
racial minorities also “found that civic engagement in adolescence is
related to higher life satisfaction, civic participation, and educational
attainment, and is related to lower rates of arrest in emerging
adulthood.”170
Of course, as criminal justice citizenship’s benefits enhance social
capital and benefit individuals, care must be taken to ensure that those
benefits are widely dispersed in society to benefit everyone. This is an
important point relating to juries because juries’ racial compositions often
skew toward Whites. If reforms to the jury system fail to address that
skew, the social capital created by juries might reinforce inequality.
ii. Shared Legal and Ethical Standards
Relatedly, community participation in criminal justice could
strengthen commitment to shared ethical standards.171 These values can
be substantive or procedural.172 Substantive values include what behavior
should be criminalized and how the system should sentence
wrongdoers.173 The criminal sentence “is to the moral sentiment of the
public . . . what a seal is to hot wax. It converts into a permanent final
judgment what might otherwise be a transient sentiment.”174
Procedural values are sometimes boiled down to fairness, efficiency,
and accuracy in sorting the guilty from the innocent, but there are many
more. Values are inherent to any procedure. For example, any procedure
must treat defendants as fellow citizens who are deserving of due process
and equal protection. “[M]oral questions lie at the root of criminal

168. Parissa J. Ballard et al., Impacts of Adolescent and Young Adult Civic Engagement on
Health and Socioeconomic Status in Adulthood, 90 CHILD DEV. 1138, 1148 (2019).
169. Melinda Wenner Moyer, Kid Activists Aren’t Political Pawns, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2019,
5:28 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2019/04/youth-political-activism-climate-changekids-gun-control-teens.html [https://perma.cc/NG4C-YJXG].
170. Wing Yi Chan et al., Adolescent Civic Engagement and Adult Outcomes: An
Examination Among Urban Racial Minorities, 43 J. YOUTH ADOLESCENCE 1829, 1829 (2014).
171. See Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 758–59 (2010).
172. See id. at 741.
173. See id. at 760.
174. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1392
(2003) (quoting 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883)).
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procedure. In practice, people judge criminal justice not on technical
issues, but on social and moral ones.”175
There is utility in distributing criminal liability and punishment
according to people’s “shared intuitions of justice.”176 The system’s
ability to control behavior by stigmatization depends on whether people
generally accept it as morally credible. In other words, if the criminal
law’s commands are not popular, no stigma attaches to violating them,
thus removing an important popular incentive to obey. Relatedly, the
criminal law itself helps to shape and maintain shared moral principles;
“[i]t can contribute to and harness the compliance-producing power of
interpersonal relationships and personal morality.”177 And in close cases,
where people are not sure of how to act, people may defer to the criminal
law as an authoritative statement of what the community has deemed
acceptable.178 In summary, one important reason why people obey the
law is because they fear the social consequences—not limited to criminal
punishment—of violating shared norms.179
iii. Firsthand Knowledge of Government
Another major benefit of citizens’ active participation in government
is that they learn firsthand about how the system works. This was Alexis
de Tocqueville’s observation about jury duty, but it should apply to other
democratic criminal justice reforms as well. He wrote,
Local institutions are to liberty . . . what primary schools are
to science; they put it within the people’s reach; they teach
people to appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom
them to make use of it. Without local institutions, a nation
may give itself a free government, but it has not got the spirit
of liberty.180

175. Id. at 1389.
176. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 18 (2007).
177. Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological,
and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 154 (2008).
178. See id.
179. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468
(1997); see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 176, at 19 (stating that another reason why people
obey the law is because they have internalized society’s moral standards and they want to “live
up to” those moral standards).
180. Levin, supra note 65, at 30 (stating that Tocqueville believed that “civic life itself could
advance this cause through both the private associations of civil society and the public institutions
of an active democracy”).
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Modern sociological research has confirmed Tocqueville’s observations:
jury service tends to increase citizens’ understanding of, and confidence
in, the legal system.181
3. Limits of Participation
Although beneficial, citizen participation is not without its limits.
First, citizens have limited capacities and often lack relevant expertise.182
For example, legal professionals necessarily dominate the courtroom
presentation of evidence and arguments, and lay juries cannot interpret
byzantine laws better than judges. Furthermore, for practical reasons, all
large democracies are representative democracies, employing
intermediaries to represent the people. Thus, the challenge is finding just
the right amount of citizen participation to complement representative
government and its attendant bureaucracy.183 Citizenship-minded reform
seeks to reap the benefits of participation by letting citizens do what they
do well, while at the same time achieving substantive results that are
consistent with the membership concerns outlined above.
Second, participation can never completely close the gap between
professional insiders and lay outsiders.184 Outsiders (i.e., voters and
reform-minded politicians) might determine that insiders (i.e., the
professionals, bureaucrats, and lawyers) are failing to represent the
people’s interests, but insiders, with their expert understanding of the
inner workings of the system, are often able to stymie or defeat reforms
imposed by outsiders.185 This does not necessarily represent a failure of
democracy, assuming that elected representatives and duly appointed
bureaucrats are honorably fulfilling their functions within the system. But
because bureaucrats are only indirectly accountable to the people,
outsiders need several mechanisms to keep them in check, including
181.
182.
183.
184.

JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY 9–11, 129–30, 152–53 (2010).
See BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS 6–8 (2015).
See id. at 7.
Bibas, supra note 106, at 952.
“A note of pessimism is in order. We are not about to abandon the twentyfirst-century world of guilty pleas and return to the eighteenth century anytime
soon . . . . As long as professionals run criminal justice, there will be a significant
gap of information, participation, and desires between insiders and outsiders.
Politicians and the media will continue to exploit and exacerbate the gap, and
sound-bite policymaking will continue to work. Nevertheless, reforms could at
least improve the current dismal state of affairs, creating more community
knowledge, involvement, and oversight.”

Id.

185. See id. at 941, 943 (discussing how the “Three-Strikes, You’re Out” Law in California
attempted to curtail prosecutors’ charging discretion and how prosecutors found ways around it).
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electoral accountability of those appointing the bureaucrats, sufficient
transparency, and, at appropriate stages of the criminal process, direct
participation.
Third, citizens can and do act in biased ways as they participate. The
best example of the accumulated effects of this bias is the phenomenon
of mass incarceration. The United States leads the world in incarceration
rates, which are astronomical.186 Nearly 2.3 million people are
incarcerated in the United States.187 Another 840,000 are on parole and
3.6 million people are on probation.188 This mass incarceration inflicts
especially severe harms on poor communities and communities of
color.189 For example, one in three Black males born today, and one in
six Hispanic males born today, can expect to be incarcerated in their
lifetimes, as compared with one in seventeen White males.190 And even
after convicts have served their time, they and their communities continue
to suffer from the negative effects of incarceration.191
Because so much of mass incarceration can be attributed to
democratic excesses, many scholars have proposed “penal elitism” as the
remedy—that is, putting the criminal justice system in the hands of
experts.192 But this partially misdiagnoses the causes of mass
incarceration. This crisis came to pass not only by lay participation, the
choices of voters, elected officials, and juries. The professionals
participated, too, and distorted the public will; bias can be demonstrated
in the actions of police, prosecutors, bureaucrats, judges, and other
professionals.193 The extreme inequality present in the criminal justice
system has arisen out of the innumerable choices by professionals and lay
persons alike, in all stages of the system and over a long period of time.
186. See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(2011) (discussing the massive growth in America’s prison population).
187. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html
[https://perma.cc/NK75-P4WG].
188. Id.
189. ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 97–139.
190. Mass Incarceration, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/massincarceration [https://perma.cc/K7KF-ZW79].
191. For a discussion on the collateral effects of incarceration on the formerly incarcerated,
including health problems, denial of civil rights such as the right to vote, and weakened and broken
relationships of incarceration, see David S. Kirk & Sara Wakefield, Collateral Consequences of
Punishment: A Critical Review and Path Forward, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 171, 171, 175
(2018).
192. Albert W. Dzur et al., Punishment and Democratic Theory: Resources for a Better
Penal Politics, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND MASS INCARCERATION, supra note 62, at 1, 4. See
generally RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS (2019) (discussing the public’s lack of
reliance on experts when addressing how to reduce crime and other elements of penal elitism).
193. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 109, 118, 123.
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Each proposed reform will have to consider how bias can be rooted out
at every step in the process. At the same time, in America’s democracy,
the system can never stray too far from the people’s control if it is to
enjoy legitimacy; in other words, there can be a greater role for the
experts in certain aspects of criminal justice, even as the people get their
say in others.
A final limitation on citizens’ participation is that most Americans do
not want to participate in democracy.194 They would rather not make
political decisions or participate in deliberations, and they do not care
about most policy issues. To put it bluntly, they would rather “spend their
time in nonpolitical pursuits.”195 Only on the rare occasions when they
do want to be involved do they want democratic processes to be visible,
accountable, and representative.196 This is partly a function of
socioeconomic status: people who are less educated have a harder time
getting informed, and people struggling to make ends meet have less time
to participate in politics, community action, or jury service.197
C. Deliberation
Like participation, deliberation is a key principle of democratic
citizenship. Deliberation is the process by which people in specific
forums (e.g., juries, city councils, the public square) engage in reasoned
discussions to make, or help others make, better collective decisions.
Many scholars have argued that society should incorporate more
deliberative features into America’s institutions, including courts,
legislatures, and agencies.198
In democratic theory, deliberation often complements participation.
For example, although it is possible to participate in politics sincerely but
not rationally (e.g., a juror who refuses to listen to the other jurors in
deliberations), it is more desirable that participation be rational. Likewise,
deliberation is only one form of participation, but studying, thinking,
talking, listening, and even voting are not enough on their own to power
America’s democracy; broader participation is required. Thus, these two
strains of democratic theory are often paired.
Political scientists have identified the following key features of
deliberative democracy:
(1) Citizens regard each other as moral equals.
194. See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY 1 (2002)
(“The last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision making . . . .”).
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id.
197. See PUTNAM, supra note 148, at 192–93.
198. Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating Improve
Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 10 & nn.5–7 (2006) (collecting citations).
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(2) There is a public sphere to which all have free and equal
access.
(3) The people have strong free speech rights, and there are
norms of respect, civility, and listening to buttress those
rights.
(4) The public focuses its deliberations on the most
important issues.
(5) The public is sufficiently informed about these issues via
transparency in government and a free press.
(6) The deliberations are based on reason, as opposed to pure
emotion or threats, and participants are at least in principle
willing to change their minds.
(7) The deliberations result in a decision based on public
consensus.
(8) The relevant governmental decision makers are
meaningfully responsive to that decision.
(9) Deliberation can lead to greater social welfare.
Each of these ideals is discussed below. “Because previous
sociological research suggests that these requirements are rarely met,
deliberative theory tends to be normative in tone.”199 That point could be
made much more strongly in the current highly polarized political
climate. But the fact that perfect deliberations rarely exist is no reason to
reject these ideals. Public deliberations are built into America’s
constitutional order and must be employed, if only at some minimal
threshold of quality, for that order to succeed.200 Furthermore, even lessthan-perfect deliberations can improve social welfare, as discussed below
in Section II.C.9.
Citizen deliberations play a key role in the criminal justice system.
That system has many specialized functions, some of which require
sensitive, individualized moral judgments. Defining crimes, for example,
is an expression of society’s most fundamental ideals, and punishment
must reflect, in some way, the community’s rejection of criminal
behavior and its conception of how to deal with it. The same goes for
whether and how justice might be served in particular cases by convicting
the accused and imposing punishment, in light of all the surrounding
circumstances. The deliberation and participation of citizens in these
decisions are both vital. Citizens can bring common sense value
199. Rubin, supra note 110, at 747.
200. See infra Section II.C.9.
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judgments to the process where difficult questions of justice, mercy, and
retribution require a sensitive balancing of values that may elude
bureaucrats.201 Overall, citizen deliberation can improve outcomes, shore
up legitimacy, and strengthen solidarity and commitment to attempt to restitch the social fabric.202
Criminal justice professionals are also necessary. Their expertise can
provide stability, dispassion, bureaucratic regularity, predictability,
efficiency, and technical and scientific rigor. But if this rationalizing and
bureaucratizing the criminal justice process is taken to excess, the process
may cease to reflect the ethical life of the people it is meant to serve,
imposing instead a set of values inimical to the people’s. The resulting
system may ultimately fail to repair broken relationships.
Below, this Article considers nine important features of democratic
deliberations and their application to the criminal justice system.
1. Shared Recognition of Other Citizens as Moral Equals
Participants of deliberations must regard each other as equals.203 This
quality of citizenship is captured by Cass Sunstein’s notion of political
“grace.”204 For Sunstein, grace is a character trait of democratic citizens
that “embodies a commitment to empathy” for others’ views and
experiences. 205 It assumes that one’s political opponents act in good faith;
it refuses to engage in “political savagery.”206 This trait in the citizenry
makes possible both “political learning” and compromise.207 In other
words, deliberations founded upon public graciousness can result not
only in greater consensus—no small feat in a society with competing
interest groups—but also greater wisdom than each group initially
brought to the debate.208 Furthermore, “[w]hen people see each other as
fellow citizens rather than as enemies, they are more likely to attend not
only to different judgments about facts, but also to different moral
commitments. Manichaeism becomes difficult or even impossible.”209 In
201. Note that bureaucrats may have a better understanding of more scientific questions,
such as how to deter crime and reintegrate offenders into society.
202. See Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1400.
203. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 198, at 15 (citing Joshua Cohen, Procedure and
Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 95, 100 (Seyla Benhabib
ed., 1996)).
204. Cass Sunstein, Political Savagery Makes Self-government Impossible, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/03/08/political-savagery-makesself-government-impossible [https://perma.cc/6ENJ-YZ6E].
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. Id.
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other words, graceful citizens, by empathizing with their opponent’s
views, cannot help but have more nuanced views themselves.
Deliberation among citizens by its nature should limit the scope of
criminal law. “Criminalization requires a more piecemeal process of
public deliberation: what will limit the law’s scope is not some master
principle(s), but the spirit in which such deliberation is conducted—as
deliberation about what we can properly demand of each other as citizens
on pain of formal condemnation and punishment.”210 In the same way,
citizens who view each other as moral equals see more purposes to
criminal justice than pure retribution. They also seek to understand why
a defendant acted the way that he did; they seek to reintegrate that person
into the community. They reject the brand of racism that, although
lacking overt insults or epithets, demonstrates little concern for the plight
of communities of color and turns a blind eye to the mass incarceration
of citizens of color and the negative effects this has on their families and
communities.211
2. Public Sphere to Which All Have Free and Equal Access
Healthy democratic deliberations require a public sphere in which
members of the political community can communicate about public life
on free and equal terms, having access to the relevant means of
communication.212 If the voices of more advantaged participants to the
process are disproportionately amplified, outcomes will be distorted and
the other views of the group may remain unexplored. These distorted
outcomes could “reproduce the inequalities and power relations among
the participants.”213 This “deeply undermine[s]” the democratic ideal of
popular self-rule.214 In criminal justice, a few examples of access to
public spheres include equal and effective opportunities to voice opinions
in the public square, equal representation on juries, and local influence
over policing policy and priorities.
3. Freedom of Speech and Norms of Respect, Civility, and Listening
A deliberative democracy ideally protects broad speech rights,215 as
well as cultural and political norms of respect, civility, and listening to
support those rights. English philosopher John Stuart Mill described these
norms, which he called the “morality of public discussion,” in his famous
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Duff, supra note 91, at 303.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 103, 113.
See Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1385.
James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge, Introduction, DAEDALUS, Summer 2017, at 6, 9.
Id. at 7.
Cohen, supra note 146, at 57–58, 70.
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tract “On Liberty.”216 Mill argued that civil discourse should be
“temperate” (as by avoiding “invective” and “sarcasm”) and “not pass the
bounds of fair discussion.”217 None should “argue sophistically, . . .
suppress facts or arguments, . . . misstate the elements of the case, or
misrepresent the opposite opinion.”218 Polemicists should never
“stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral
men.”219 Those who hold the prevailing view need to observe the rules of
civil discourse more scrupulously because the tendency in public
discourse is for the majority to use shaming and other unfair tactics to
silence the minority.220 To effectively deliberate, society should give
“merited honour to every one, whatever opinion he may hold, who has
calmness to see and honesty to state what his opponents and their
opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping
nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favor.”221
Mill recognized that this ideal was often violated but noted optimistically
“that there are many controversialists who to a great extent observe it,
and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it.”222
In criminal justice, examples of this include standard rules of
engagement in town hall forums, jury instructions about how to
deliberate, and rules of courtroom decorum.223
4. A Debate of Only the Most Important Public Issues
Next, citizens must debate at least the most important issues in the
public sphere.224 In ancient Athens, perhaps all the citizens could debate
all matters of public importance. But that would be impossible in a large,
modern society. Today, a whole citizenry cannot deliberate with each
other on any issue, let alone all of them. In a representative democracy,
moreover, society generally elects politicians to engage in such
legislative deliberations on behalf of the people, or society willingly
216. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM 3, 70 (Bantam
Dell 2008) (1859).
217. Id. at 68–69.
218. Id. at 68.
219. Id. at 69.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 70.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Courtroom Etiquette, ILL. CTS., http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Supreme
Court/Etiquette.asp [https://perma.cc/HKW5-Z85Z]; Mark Preston, CNN Announces Rules for
Next Democratic Presidential Debates, CNN (July 9, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2019/07/09/politics/cnn-debate-rules/index.html [https://perma.cc/QYV7-JGGT] (listing rules
for democratic primary debates, including that “[a] candidate who consistently interrupts will have
his or her time reduced”).
224. Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1385.
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assents to experts in the criminal justice system (e.g., professionalized
police forces, probation and parole officers) making difficult decisions
for the people. Furthermore, leaving aside questions of system design,
deliberations take a toll on each participant. Most people are either
unwilling or unable to put in the time and effort to become familiar with
the issues they care about, let alone the issues they care less about. And
few are inclined to listen to and try to understand the views of those
whose opinions differ.225
Still, citizens can and should deliberate about certain criminal justice
issues. Trial juries do this in specific cases, but other examples come to
mind, such as public hearings on particular police practices or ballot
initiatives like Three Strikes—and its repeal—in California.
5. A Populace Informed About the Relevant Issues
To deliberate well, the populace must be sufficiently informed on the
issues.226 To become informed, the government must be transparent, the
news media must be robust, and the people must be both interested in the
issues and able to become informed.
Transparency is especially important. Members of the public cannot
personally participate in criminal justice processes, so the public,
researchers, and the media must be able to monitor these processes. This
includes open meetings, public jury trials, the gathering and publication
of statistics relating to the criminal justice system,227 and judicial
reluctance to seal court files and proceedings. Interest groups and
concerned citizens also help to publicize the system’s workings.228
Transparency enables deliberation and democratic action.
6. Reasoned Discussion, Not Based on Emotion or Threats
Citizens in their deliberations should attempt to persuade each other
through reason, as opposed to pure emotion or threats.229 This is not a
controversial idea, but it reveals a clear shortcoming of deliberative
democracy because, in real life, people do not deliberate based on reason
225. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 198, at 11–12.
226. Dalton calls this broad principle of citizenship “autonomy,” which requires citizens to
be sufficiently informed about the issues, to participate in democratic deliberations, and ideally to
understand others’ views. See Dalton, supra note 60, at 78–79.
227. See, e.g., Jason Tashea, Liberating Criminal Justice Data: How a Florida Law Provides
a Blueprint for the Nation, A.B.A. J. (June 18, 2019, 6:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
web/article/liberating-criminal-justice-data-how-a-florida-law-offers-a-blueprint-for-the-nation
[https://perma.cc/Q35N-T2TC] (describing efforts of Measures for Justice, a non-profit
organization, to collect and publicize data relating to criminal justice).
228. See Simonson, supra note 2, at 2184–90.
229. See Cohen, supra note 146, at 58, 70.
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alone. Moreover, what is “reasonable” is itself debatable. Reason is often
employed post hoc to justify conclusions to which people are already
inclined based on personal experiences, tribal identities, and emotions.230
In politics, for example, individuals might have such vested interests in
the outcome of a debate that it is unlikely others’ reasoning will dissuade
them.231
For quality deliberations to occur, citizens must at least be open to
changing their minds.232 Philosopher John Stuart Mill provided a good
description of this:
[T]he only way in which a human being can make some
approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing
what can be said about it by persons of every variety of
opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at
by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his
wisdom in any mode but this . . . .233
Of course, in practice, members of society are not usually very open
to changing their minds.234 But in a well-functioning democracy, those in
the minority will be prepared to accept the decision of the group even if
they do not agree with it.235 If they feel that their views have been listened
to and considered, they will more likely view group decisions as
legitimate.236 This legitimacy is possible even where only a small subset
of the population was involved in making the decisions.237
7. The Deliberations Result in a Decision Based on Public Consensus
The most basic purpose of public deliberations is to arrive at a
decision or consensus by changing the preferences upon which people
decide to act.238 In other words, the conclusion of the debate should at
least “represent a mutually agreed-upon position” of the most people

230. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“As
long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions
will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his
opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be
objects to which the latter will attach themselves.”).
231. See Rubin, supra note 110, at 750–51.
232. Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1385.
233. MILL, supra note 216, at 27, 67 (noting that truth can be supplied by “the collision of
adverse opinions”).
234. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 198, at 12.
235. See id. at 15.
236. Meares & Tyler, supra note 89, at 526–27.
237. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 198, at 15.
238. Id. at 14.
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possible.239 This ideal can be traced back to ancient Athens, where
citizens engaged in extended public debate to achieve not just consensus
but unanimity, called homonoia.240 Aristotle thought, probably correctly,
that homonoia was only possible in a small, tightly-knit, homogeneous
society like Athens.241 Of course, this unanimity was an illusion because
the voices of most Greeks, such as women and slaves, were excluded
from the formation of homonoia.242 In today’s large, diverse society,
achieving unanimity is impossible, but some degree of consensus and
mutual understanding must and can often be achieved.
True, social consensus has its downsides. Too much consensus can
actually hamper future deliberations because citizens who all agree have
no need to consider new arguments and approaches.243 Over time, people
may become stuck in old ways of thinking and unable to solve new
challenges.244 Furthermore, people may prefer to conform to the
consensus for conformity’s sake rather than risk social disapproval by
supporting novel and better ideas.245
There have long been a few points of consensus in the United States
about criminal procedure, at least in the broad brush strokes. These points
include the presumption of innocence, due process of law, and the right
to a jury trial. Regarding punishment, society has been somewhat
schizophrenic, agreeing about both retribution (especially for those in
out-groups) and rehabilitation (especially for members of in-groups).246
8. Government Should be Meaningfully Responsive to the
Deliberations
Deliberations should determine “the basic thrust of public policy”;247
that is, the government should heed the results of public deliberation
(insofar as such results can be ascertained).248 If the state does not
respond to the people’s deliberations, the deliberations can sometimes
seem like a mere ploy to provide an illusion of power and influence.249
239. Rubin, supra note 110, at 747.
240. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 34.
241. Id. at 33–34.
242. See id. at 34.
243. Henrik Friberg-Fernros & Johan Karlsson Schaffer, The Consensus Paradox: Does
Deliberative Agreement Impede Rational Discourse?, 62 POL. STUD. 99, 99 (2014).
244. Id. at 104.
245. Id. at 104–05.
246. See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1321 & n.21 (2005).
247. Rubin, supra note 110, at 747.
248. Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1385.
249. For example, in the wake of the Gilets Jaunes protests, the French government held
three months of public debate that distracted protesters and apparently drained the movement of
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Deliberative processes should specify how exactly the decisions arrived
at will be implemented.250 Also, there has to be an agreed-upon
framework for how to apply a general rule—arrived at by proper
deliberations—to a particular case.251 Designing the correct institution is
essential to the deliberative model.252
Part of deliberation’s appeal as being fundamental to democracy is
that it allows the people to self-legislate. One can imagine a
representative democracy where elected officials simply deliberate
among themselves and pass laws with little or no public deliberation. But
public deliberation enables a more direct form of self-rule; it allows the
people to be the author of their own laws in addition to electing leaders
to enact them.253
The Constitution recognizes the potential power of deliberations and
enshrines them in and between the branches of government. For example,
both chambers of Congress deliberate internally on the passage of
laws.254 The deliberations of members of Congress are protected by the
Speech and Debate Clause.255 There is a back-and-forth between the
Congress and the President requiring “[r]econsideration” when they
cannot agree over the passage of a law;256 there are special deliberative
procedures for ratifying treaties (e.g., Advice and Consent of the Senate)
and making executive appointments.257 By “giv[ing] . . . Information of
the State of the Union” and making recommendations, the President
engages in deliberations with Congress.258 Special deliberations are
baked into the Judicial Branch as well, which has its own jury trial
guarantee.259 Juries are small groups of citizens from outside the
government whose deliberations bind the government.
Outside of the tripartite branches, the Constitution protects and fosters
deliberation among citizens and between citizens and their government.
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech and of the press and
energy and momentum. Adam Nossiter, ‘Debate’ in France Is Over, With Much Left to Discuss,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2019, § A, at 8.
250. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 198, at 15.
251. Id. at 16.
252. Id.
253. Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1385.
254. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7.
255. Id. § 6 (“[A]nd for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned
in any other Place.”).
256. Id. § 7.
257. Id. art. II, § 2.
258. Id. § 3 (“He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient . . . .”).
259. Id. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury . . . .”).
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“the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”260 And Article IV guarantees a
“Republican Form of Government” to each state,261 which guarantees,
inter alia, rule by the people.262
In summary, one reason that Americans expect to have the
opportunity to participate in public deliberations of important issues,
including criminal justice issues, derives from the Constitution’s
numerous and popular deliberative features. This, in turn, helps to explain
the prominence of criminal justice issues in politics.
9. Deliberation Can Lead to Greater Social Welfare
There are two strands of theory supporting deliberative democracy.263
One strand is essentially normative and claims that deliberations are
necessary to any desirable version of democracy.264 Much of the
foregoing discussion has focused on these normative arguments.
The other strand claims that deliberation actually improves social
welfare.265 This notion was described well by Mill, who argued that “on
any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine persons totally
incapable of judging of it, for one who is capable.”266 Nevertheless, Mill
observed “a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and
rational conduct.”267 This seeming paradox could be explained, at least in
part, by the power of deliberation: “[M]an either as an intellectual or as a
moral being . . . is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and
experience. . . . Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and
argument . . . .”268
More recently, the promises of deliberative democracy have been
summarized as follows: to “revive democratic legitimacy, provide for
260. Id. amend. I.
261. Id. art. IV, § 4.
FOUND.,
262. See
Robert
G.
Natelson,
Guarantee
Clause,
HERITAGE
www.heritage.org/constitution?essay_id=10000127 [https://perma.cc/7RQU-T7HQ] (scroll to
“Essays on Article IV”; click “Guarantee Clause”) (stating that the Guarantee Clause also ensures
the rule of law and absence of monarchy); see also Robert G. Natelson, A Republic Not a
Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV.
807, 812 (2002) (discussing cases that mention that republic government is representative
government). The electoral college and indirect election of senators are other examples of filtering
the people’s votes through more elite guardians of the public will. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; id.
art. II, § 1.
263. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 198, at 13.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 14.
266. MILL, supra note 216, at 26.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 26–27.
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more authentic public will formation, provide a middle ground between
widely mistrusted elites and the angry voices of populism, and help fulfill
some of our common normative expectations about democracy.”269 There
is empirical evidence for these claims. Summarizing the evidence in the
field, a group of scholars has argued that deliberation is essential to any
well-functioning democracy.270 Deliberative theory has begun to
consider the varying speech cultures of socially disadvantaged groups,
and deliberative practice has ways of amplifying the voices of these
groups.271 Furthermore, contra claims that deliberation tends to result in
more extreme views, deliberation can actually moderate views when the
deliberative body is heterogeneous.272 In fact, “deliberative practices can
flourish in deeply divided societies.”273
It is true that the design of a particular deliberative mechanism or
institution is critical, and there is no space here to discuss them in detail.
But some innovations are particularly promising. One popular
experiment involves statistically representative “mini-publics” (of
perhaps a few hundred) or “citizens’ juries” (of perhaps a few dozen) that
are tasked with deliberating a public issue in an organized setting.274 They
arrive at a nonbinding (or perhaps even a binding) recommendation for
the decision maker.275 This recommendation does not merely express the
preexisting opinions of the majority of the mini-public but is arrived at
through a long, structured, and facilitated process, ensuring that the
recommendation truly results from the mini-public’s deliberations.276
Of course, there is a robust scholarly debate surrounding these
claims.277 Some experts, for example, have concluded that “[w]hatever
the relationship between idealized theories of deliberation and social
welfare, deliberation in practice is unlikely to improve social welfare
because it is improbable that groups of people will be willing to speak,
269. Fishkin & Mansbridge, supra note 213, at 7.
270. Nicole Curato et al., Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research,
DÆDALUS, Summer 2017, at 28, 29.
271. See id. at 30–31.
272. Id. at 33. Another deliberative condition that resists polarization is the presence of a
facilitator. Id. Polarization following deliberation is not necessarily a bad thing, such as when the
process allows oppressed minorities the opportunity to more clearly form their views and share
them with other like-minded members of the deliberative body. See id.
273. Id.
274. Fishkin & Mansbridge, supra note 213, at 8–9.
275. Id.
276. For an example of how this might have worked in the context of Brexit, see Claus Offe,
Referendum vs. Institutionalized Deliberation: What Democratic Theorists Can Learn from the
2016 Brexit Decision, DÆDALUS, Summer 2017, at 14, 23–25.
277. See, e.g., Ian Shapiro, Collusion in Restraint of Democracy: Against Political
Deliberation, DÆDALUS, Summer 2017, at 77, 78–79.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/2
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd 120

42
9/29/20 7:36 AM

McConkie, Jr.: Criminal Justic Citizenship

CRIMINAL JUSTICE CITIZENSHIP

2020]

1065

listen, and learn from one another.”278 Furthermore, the current age may
represent a nadir in deliberations in the public square. A Pew survey
recently found that “58% of adults are not confident that others can hold
civil conversations with people who have different views.”279
Notwithstanding all this, the claim of some that deliberative
democracy is unrealistic is simply not true.280 The deliberative ideal is
worth striving for, both because it is necessary to any desirable version
of democracy and because, under at least some conditions, it works. In
criminal adjudication, for example, the United States has a long history
of using juries to decide criminal cases. In Part III, this Article turns to
how well this institution comports with the ideals of criminal justice
citizenship, including deliberation, and how it might be reformed.
III. CRIMINAL JUSTICE CITIZENSHIP IN THE COURTS
Applying the theory of criminal justice citizenship to jury trials yields
powerful theoretical and policy insights. Jury trials should strengthen the
key social conditions of citizenship discussed in Part II: membership,
participation, and deliberation. This insight points to the benefits of more
and better jury trials. However, these benefits are offset by the costs of
jury trials, which must be carefully weighed in the balance.
A. Membership
As explained above, citizenship qua membership encompasses four
interrelated principles: equality, belonging, solidarity, and legitimacy.281
A jury trial system that supports criminal justice citizenship must respect
each one of these.
First, citizens should have equal rights to serve on juries, and all jurors
should have an equal voice.282 Constitutional law recognizes the
importance of equality in jury composition. Although Blacks had long
been excluded from American juries,283 in the 1986 case Batson v.
Kentucky,284 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection
278. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 198, at 12.
279. Lee Rainie et al., Trust and Distrust in America, PEW RES. CTR. (July 22, 2019),
https://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/trust-and-distrust-in-america/?fbclid=IwAR2tC_ehX
7RKhhI22llsLL0-1QiCCwOIBt1glzPAhNQDRGhuGoAhkx945Dk [https://perma.cc/7WR4-D6L8].
280. See Curato et al., supra note 270, at 29 (summarizing ways in which diverse deliberative
innovations have been implemented to effectively influence policies).
281. See supra Section II.A.
282. See Duff, supra note 99, at 302 (arguing that a jury trial should be a way for citizens to
hold a fellow citizen accountable for a proved breach of the law).
283. See, e.g., Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1595
(2018).
284. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Clause forbids members of the jury venire from being excluded on
account of their race.285 (However, the Court did not hold that defendants
had a right to have members of their own race on the petit jury.286) The
Court made clear that this right belonged not only to defendants but also
to prospective jurors, who had an interest as citizens in participating in
criminal adjudication.287 Excluding venire members on account of race
diminished the democratic legitimacy of the jury trial.288
Unfortunately, Batson has had limited success in practice. For
example, on federal juries, Blacks and Hispanics are persistently and
substantially underrepresented.289 The Equal Justice Initiative has
documented widespread racial discrimination in jury selection in eight
states, including counties in which prosecutors have excluded about 80%
of qualified Blacks from jury service.290 A jury lacks democratic
legitimacy if it does not meaningfully represent a cross-section of the
community.291 Much could be done to address this problem.292 For
example, state governments could expand their jury lists to take
underrepresented groups into account, and prosecutors who intentionally
exclude jurors based on race could be disciplined.293
Likewise, where jury deliberations are infected by racism, equal
citizenship is undermined, and with it the public’s confidence in the
criminal justice system. Historically, many jury decisions have been
tainted by racism.294 Although some progress has been made, racism
285. Id. at 85–88.
286. Id. at 85.
287. Id. at 87. In Apprendi, the Court extolled the jury in its communitarian role as “twelve
of [the defendant’s] equals and neighbors” and as “the great bulwark of [our] civil and political
liberties.” Appleman, supra note 171, at 735–36 (alterations in original) (quoting Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000)). Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurrence likewise stressed
the idea that the Founders left criminal justice to juries, not the state. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498
(Scalia, J., concurring).
288. See Appleman, supra note 171, at 732.
289. See Jeffrey Abramson, Jury Selection in the Weeds: Whither the Democratic Shore?,
52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 11−12 (2018) (examining treatment of four challenges to jury pools
in four federal districts).
290. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 94, at 4–5.
291. See Toby S. Goldbach & Valerie P. Hans, Juries, Lay Judges and Trials, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2716, 2719 (Gerben Bruinsma & David
Weisburd eds., 2014).
292. Paradoxically, prosecutors often feel that they must consider race very carefully during
jury selection to avoid Batson challenges. See Anna Offit, Race Conscious Jury Selection, 82
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 44–68 (forthcoming 2021).
293. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 94, at 46, 48.
294. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 119–21; Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries,
Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX.
L. REV. 1401, 1410 (1983).
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persists in modern jury deliberations throughout the United States.295 One
cause of this is that unrepresentative juries deliberate less effectively than
diverse juries. “Research suggests that, compared to diverse juries, allwhite juries tend to spend less time deliberating, make more errors, and
consider fewer perspectives.”296 Furthermore, “[r]acial diversity
significantly improves a jury’s ability to assess the reliability and
credibility of witness testimony, evaluate the accuracy of cross-racial
identifications, avoid presumptions of guilt, and fairly judge a criminally
accused.”297 The upshot has been that communities of color nationwide
have, in many cases, lost confidence in mostly-white and all-white
juries.298
Another good example of how the jury system defeats equal
membership is the automatic exclusion of formerly convicted persons
(for felonies and even misdemeanors) from the jury. Most states have
statutory provisions to this effect, and many of those statutes pay no
regard to the type or age of the conviction, the individual’s subsequent
years of good behavior, or even the individual’s current attitude toward
the criminal justice system.299 Such exclusions heighten racial disparities
in jury pools because people of color are often more likely to have a prior
criminal conviction.300 This, in turn, reduces the diversity of experience
with the criminal justice system that is necessary for effective jury
deliberations.301 Finally, the exclusion denies an important civic
opportunity and is therefore at odds with society’s goals of reintegrating
formerly convicted persons.302 While there may be good reasons in
individual cases why such persons could not be fair and impartial jurors,
the blanket exclusion of them from jury service unjustifiably restricts
criminal justice citizenship. Even their exclusion through the use of
peremptory strikes is questionable and should be carefully regulated
because it may serve as a cover for racial or ethnic biases.303 Additionally,
295. See, e.g., BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY 60–61 (documenting instances of
discrimination by Southern all-white juries against Black defendants); Shamena Anwar et al., Jury
Discrimination in Criminal Trials 2 (Queen Mary Univ. of London Sch. of Econ. & Fin., Working
Paper No. 671, 2010) (examining data from Sarasota County, Florida, between 2004 and 2009,
and finding “strong evidence that all-white juries acquit whites more often and are less favorable
to black versus white defendants when compared to juries with at least one black member”).
296. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 94, at 40.
297. Id. at 41.
298. Id. at 38.
299. Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions,
98 MINN. L. REV. 592, 596–97 (2013).
300. Id. at 602.
301. Id. at 605–06.
302. Id. at 610–13.
303. Id. at 638–39; see also Simonson, supra note 3, at 277–80 (arguing that the system tends
to characterize prospective jurors as biased if they are defense oriented).
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the system should take affirmative steps to make jury service more
accessible to people of lower socioeconomic status, such as by providing
job protection, decent stipends, and childcare.304
Second, where the right of jury service is not equally afforded, citizens
may suffer from exclusion and a feeling of not belonging. In 2010,
researchers from the Equal Justice Initiative study interviewed many
Blacks who had been improperly excluded from jury service and found
that the experience left many of them with “the sad recognition that their
individual experiences were small pieces in the structure of racism that
envelops their communities.”305 “Many had overcome the legacy of the
Jim Crow South to serve in the military, own businesses, and send their
children to college, only to find discrimination still as close as their
county courthouse.”306 This feeling of exclusion marginalizes otherwise
willing citizens from making a contribution to society.307 The effects of
this exclusion can ripple through their lives and reduce their likelihood of
voting.308
Third, the jury system can strengthen social solidarity by solidifying
a sense of the public good and strengthening people’s resolve to work
toward that public good. A jury trial requires citizens to sit in judgment
of each other. There is live witness testimony, courtroom intrigue, and all
the spectacle that entails. The ensuing dramatic morality play reinforces
the moral commands of the criminal law and strengthens the
community’s resolve to abide by its commands.309 Where the jury trial is
perceived to be fair, many people feel that the jury speaks on behalf of
the jurisdiction it represents. This is why the Supreme Court has
recognized the jury as the “conscience of the community.”310

304. Roberts, supra note 299, at 639.
305. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 94, at 29.
306. Id. at 28.
307. For example, Blacks and Hispanics are far less likely than Whites to believe that jury
service is important to being a good citizen. John Gramlich, Jury Duty Is Rare, but Most
Americans See It as Part of Good Citizenship, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rare-but-most-americans-see-itas-part-of-good-citizenship/ [https://perma.cc/CHL5-WKYM].
308. See BERNARD L. FRAGA, THE TURNOUT GAP 20–21 (2018).
309. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 4, at 5; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 24−27 (1993) (noting that “criminal justice as social drama” was a
common feature of colonial America). The common law has long recognized this. For example,
the English Murder Act of 1752 required that, after the trial, the sentence must be pronounced
immediately in the hearing of the public. APPLEMAN, supra note 8, at 17. This way, the jury and
the entire criminal trial audience would have the benefit of witnessing the consequences of crime.
Id.
310. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
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Unfortunately, where the trial is perceived as unfair or the jury as biased,
a jury verdict can divide the community.311
Jury service can strengthen social solidarity by enhancing people’s
commitment to the public good. Tocqueville made this argument long
ago:
The jury teaches every man not to recoil before the
responsibility of his own actions. . . . It invests each citizen
with a kind of magistracy, it makes them all feel the duties
which they are bound to discharge towards society, and the
part which they take in the Government. By obliging men to
turn their attention to affairs which are not exclusively their
own, it rubs off that individual egotism which is the rust of
society.312
For example, D. Graham Burnett served as the foreman of a New York
City jury trial for murder.313 After the murder trial for which he served as
foreman concluded, he returned to his normal life and felt keenly a
disorienting loss of greater purpose.314 Burnett’s service as a juror had
changed him by allowing him to participate in an institution greater than
himself, concerned only with the common good. Likewise, Professor
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson has discussed his personal experience of acting
as a defense attorney in a homicide trial.315 The defense was selfdefense.316 The jury acquitted the defendant after some difficulty.317
Afterward, the jury and lawyers gathered together, spontaneously holding
hands in a circle, as a token of unity, in recognition of the difficulty (but
essential fairness) of the trial process while at the same time
acknowledging the loss to the community.318 Unfortunately, as criminal
jury trials have become rare, so too have such stories of solidarity.
Fourth, the jury system can strengthen the legitimacy of America’s
government. This has been its historical purpose: to put “real control of

311. See, e.g., Anjuli Sastry & Karen Grigsby Bates, When LA Erupted in Anger: A Look
Back at the Rodney King Riots, NPR (Aug. 26, 2017, 1:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/
04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-the-rodney-king-riots [https://perma
.cc/S6QH-C2JS] (discussing public reaction to the Rodney King verdict).
312. FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 78 (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 284–85 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1990) (1835)).
313. Id. at 76 (citing D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY (2001)).
314. Id. at 76–77.
315. Id. at 77.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 77–78.
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[legal] affairs into the hands of the ruled.”319 Jury trials were intended to
make criminal justice “fundamentally populist and majoritarian.”320
Indeed, the jury was the Framers’ “dominant strategy to keep agents of
the central government under control.”321 The Sixth Amendment’s
requirement that a jury be “of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed”322 likewise ensured that verdicts reflected
local values and understandings of the law. Because of this, juries tend to
enjoy legitimacy; the Supreme Court recently recognized that the jury’s
“judgments find acceptance in the community, an acceptance essential to
respect for the rule of law.”323 And a recent survey revealed that about
two-thirds of U.S. adults think that serving on a jury “is part of what it
means to be a good citizen.”324
In summary, jury service, when it is inclusive, has the potential of
broadly distributing membership benefits throughout society. This
Article now turns to how juries deliberate.
B. Deliberation
Jury deliberations raise issues relating to several of the ideal features
of citizen deliberation discussed above in Section II.C.
1. Expanding the Public’s Right to Jury Trials
Because deliberations are costly, only the most important issues are
suitable for public deliberations.325 The boundaries of the jury trial right
rest on similar considerations. Unfortunately, courts have sometimes too
rigidly equated the importance of a case with the length of incarceration
potentially at issue. This deprives the public of the opportunity of jury
service in high-stakes cases.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that the constitutional jury
trial right does not extend to all crimes, such as those with a maximum
penalty of fewer than six months imprisonment or petty offenses.326
319. Bibas, supra note 106, at 950 n.179 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270–76 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Harper
& Row 1988) (1835)).
320. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1185
(1991).
321. Id. at 1183.
322. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
323. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017).
324. Gramlich, supra note 307.
325. See supra Section II.C.4.
326. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (“[S]o-called ‘petty offenses’ may be
tried without a jury.”); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937) (noting that
the jury trial right “does not extend to every criminal proceeding”); see also Lewis v. United
States, 518 U.S. 322, 326 (1996) (explaining that the Court presumes that a petty offense has a
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Courts may also look to the “seriousness of other punishment” that the
crime carries in determining whether there is a constitutional jury trial
right.327 In 2018, the New York Court of Appeals held in People v.
Suazo328 that “a noncitizen defendant who demonstrates that a charged
crime carries the potential penalty of deportation—i.e., removal from the
country—is entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.”329 The
court based its reasoning in part on the severity of deportation, which
itself often involves a period of incarceration and often results in
permanent physical separation from family and loved ones. 330 At least
one other court has come to a similar conclusion.331 Other courts to
consider these issues have taken a different approach.332
One scholar has advocated expanding the jury trial right to all civil
immigration cases, too.333 This likewise could confer greater democratic
legitimacy on the immigration system and put difficult questions about
who should stay and who should be deported in front of a deliberative
body that specializes in individualized, equitable decisions. However,
expanding the jury trial right to immigration cases could be very
expensive, and care would need to be taken so that juries do not
discriminate against noncitizen litigants.
2. Transparency of Public Sphere and Fully Informed Deliberations
Effective public deliberations relating to jury trials require
transparency.334 Although criminal jury trials are rare, those who witness
the trial—either in person or through the use of technology—are still able
to both experience it and learn from it.335 Watching the trial is an
important civic act because it imparts understanding of the complexities
maximum penalty of six months in jail or less). In contrast, some states, like Texas, provide a jury
trial right for all misdemeanors. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.01(b) (West 2019).
327. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (quoting Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968)).
328. 118 N.E.3d 168 (2018).
329. Id. at 171.
330. See id. at 176.
331. See Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1246–47 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
332. See Paul T. Crane, Incorporating Collateral Consequences into Criminal Procedure,
54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5 & n.13, 6 & n.14 (2019) (collecting cases where courts have
diverged on whether a noncitizen defendant is entitled to a jury trial).
333. See generally Daniel I. Morales, It’s Time for an Immigration Jury, 108 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 36 (2013) (proposing that all cases involving the status of illegal immigrants be
decided by a jury). For an interesting proposal relating to citizen participation and gun control,
see Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, In the Civic Republic: Crime, the Inner City, and
the Democracy of Arms—Being a Disquisition on the Revival of the Militia at Large, 45 CONN.
L. REV. 1605, 1632–33 (2013).
334. Cf. supra Section II.C.5 (discussing transparency and informed deliberations).
335. See Simonson, supra note 2, at 2179, 2194, 2200, 2209.
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of criminal adjudication; this can either foster greater respect for the
system or spur activism for reform.336 These benefits weigh strongly in
favor of televising and live-streaming more criminal trials to make this
experience available to as many people as possible.337
Another issue related to the transparency of the trial is discovery
requirements. Just as a lack of transparency in the trial impedes public
deliberations about a given case and the system generally, so too do
insufficient disclosures between the parties limit the ability of the jury to
effectively deliberate about the case.338 For example, unlike civil
litigants, criminal litigants almost never have the opportunity to depose
witnesses, which in turn limits the parties’ ability to effectively prepare
for the trial and make appropriate presentations to the jury.339 This leaves
the jury unable to effectively deliberate.
3. Reasoned Deliberations
Effective deliberations should be based on reason and a consideration
of all views presented.340 Trial jurors are instructed to deliberate with
each other and are even told how to deliberate with each other,341 and the
system gives great weight and finality to their verdicts. Available
evidence indicates that jury deliberations are generally effective though
not perfect. One scholar has estimated that juries reach the right
conclusion about 90% of the time.342 Several kinds of problems can beset
336. See id. at 2176–77.
337. Likewise, although executions are rare, some states provide a right for certain members
of the public to witness them. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 546.740 (2019).
338. See McConkie, supra note 21, at 22–23.
339. See Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes,
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1091–92, 1108–10 (2014).
340. Cf. supra Section II.C.6 (discussing the importance of using reason, not emotion or
threats, in deliberations).
341. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15-5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N, 3d ed. 1996)
(“Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which informs the jury:
(1) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; (2) that jurors have a duty to
consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done
without violence to individual judgment; (3) that each juror must decide the case for himself or
herself but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with the other jurors; (4) that in
the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his or her own views and
change an opinion if the juror is convinced it is erroneous; and (5) that no juror should surrender
his or her honest belief as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of
the other jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.”).
342. See Kenneth S. Klein, Truth and Legitimacy (in Courts), 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 63
(2016) [hereinafter Klein, Truth and Legitimacy] (citing Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the
Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 310–15, 326–28 (2007)); id. at 64
(“There is ample evidence of dissatisfaction with the accuracy of dispute resolution through trial
by jury, but there is ambiguity about whether judges are perceived as any better . . . .”); see also
Paula Hannaford-Agor, On Second-Guessing Jury Verdicts, VOIR DIRE, Fall/Winter 2007, at 5
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jury deliberations. Sometimes the jury makes unfounded assumptions
about the evidence.343 Sometimes the parties cannot make a full
adversarial presentation of the case, either because of insufficient
disclosures344 or under-resourced or incompetent attorneys. Sometimes
the jury is confused by the complexity of the evidence, especially in cases
involving expert testimony.345 Sometimes the jurors make false
assumptions; for example, jurors are more likely to believe that an
eyewitness identification is accurate if the witness who made it has a high
level of confidence in the identification.346 This is in spite of the fact that
studies have shown that, where poor lineup procedures are used,
eyewitness identification is certainty a poor indicator.347
Another criticism of jury deliberations has to do with its gender
dynamics. Forepersons, who are uniquely influential, are more likely to
be male than female.348 Most studies of mock juries show that male jurors
are much more likely than female jurors to speak up during
deliberations.349 Male jurors, as compared to female jurors, speak longer
and more often, and they interrupt other speakers more.350 This limits the
effectiveness of deliberations because not all voices are heard and
because the quality of male-dominated deliberations is different. Women
are more likely than men to engage in evidence-driven deliberations,
which focus on group story construction based on the available evidence,
with voting coming at the end.351 In contrast, men are more likely to
engage in verdict-driven discussions, which begin with public voting
(critiquing Spencer’s article); Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 Is
Unconstitutional, and Why That Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077, 1097–98 (2013) [hereinafter
Klein, Why Federal Rule] (arguing that the drafters of the Constitution entrusted trials to juries
despite being aware of juries’ weaknesses).
343. See, e.g., supra Section III.A (discussing jury racism).
344. See McConkie, supra note 21, at 35–38.
345. See Goldbach & Hans, supra note 291, at 2717.
346. Id. at 2720.
347. See John T. Wixted & Gary L. Wells, The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence
and Identification Accuracy: A New Synthesis, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 10, 14−17 (2017)
(analyzing how varying conditions in police lineups can effect the accuracy of witness
identification); Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocence
project.org/eyewitness-identification-reform/ [https://perma.cc/S3ZY-LC5L].
348. Erin York Cornwell & Valerie P. Hans, Representation Through Participation: A
Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 671 (2011); Nancy S.
Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593, 595 (1987); see also Nancy
S. Marder & Valerie P. Hans, Introduction to Juries and Lay Participation: American
Perspectives and Global Trends, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789, 812 (2015) (noting that status
differences can affect jury deliberations).
349. See Marder, supra note 349, at 596.
350. Id. at 597.
351. See id. at 603.
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early in the process and focus on preferred outcomes.352 Evidence-driven
deliberations are more likely to produce accurate decisions.353 A maledominated jury with minimal female voices is also, in a sense, a smaller
jury, which dilutes the promised protection of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard.354 Courts can address this gender imbalance throughout
the trial by educating juries about gender dynamics, providing specific
instructions about how to deliberate, and encouraging women to do more
speaking and men to do more listening.355
In spite of all this, the 10% error rate shows that juries usually get it
right. That rate is worse than the best estimates of the average error rates
in plea bargaining, which have been put at somewhere between 2% and
8%,356 but plea-bargained cases may generally be more clear cut than
those more contested cases that go to jury trial. Juries have certain
strengths: they are good at recalling facts and pooling collective
knowledge,357 and they are generally able to understand and apply the
instructions at the end of the case.358 Additionally, “[s]tudies indicate that
lay participants are able to understand complex issues and often match
judges in the accuracy of their decisions.”359 Finally, it is worth bearing
in mind that jury error rates are very difficult to calculate because
reasonable people can often disagree over the right verdict.360
Many proposed reforms could improve jury deliberations and their
accuracy.361 First, there is evidence that juries would benefit from more
expert guidance. Two centuries ago, American judges used to give the
jury, at the end of the parties’ cases, a summary of and commentary about
the evidence.362 This practice has long since fallen out of favor but may
be a good way for juries to benefit from some expert evaluation of the
352. See id.
353. See id. at 604.
354. See id. at 600.
355. Id. at 606–07.
356. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-pleadguilty/ [https://perma.cc/8KDQ-ST8E]. See generally Brian H. Bornstein, Judges v. Juries, 43 CT.
REV. 56 (2006) (discussing error rates of jury trials and bench trials).
357. See Marder & Hans, supra note 348, at 799.
358. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations:
Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1594, 1605 (2012).
359. Goldbach & Hans, supra note 291, at 2724.
360. See Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 853 (2015)
(“[D]efining a ‘right’ or factually accurate verdict may be complex.”).
361. See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xx–xxi
(2015) (arguing for several reforms, including videotaping juror deliberations and making the tape
available to researchers).
362. See David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 407, 454 (2013).
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case without taking away their ability to decide it.363 Second, “studies
show that reforms . . . such as allowing note taking, asking questions,
mid-trial deliberations, and the use of notebooks to organize the evidence,
can increase the quality of lay citizen fact finding.”364 Third, jurors could
be given plain English jury instructions before opening statements instead
of after closing arguments.365
Assuming the jury is sufficiently representative and receives proper
guidance and assistance from the court in its deliberations, there is a
quality in its deliberations that decision makers cannot replicate.
“Whether parsing a factual question, seeking to apply a legal standard as
instructed, or engaging in an act of nullification, ordinary citizens serving
as jurors engage in unique acts of interpretation, redefining the very
concept of the law in terms of their own lived experiences and
expectations.”366 Juries specialize in “concrete ethical [and] other
practical valuations.”367 They need guidance and constraints to work
well, but they can indeed represent the people and deliberate in the kinds
of decisions that cannot be reduced solely to technical or scientific
judgment.
4. Jury Unanimity
Unlike most democratic decisions, which are made by majority rule,
in the federal system and virtually every state, jury verdicts must be
unanimous.368 However, in the 1972 case Apodaca v. Oregon,369 the
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment jury right, as incorporated
by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require unanimity.370 Recently,
363. Id. at 454. It is also argued that limiting instructions, though widely assumed to be
ineffective, may in fact assist the jury’s deliberations under certain conditions. Id. at 422–24.
364. Goldbach & Hans, supra note 291, at 2724; see Mark W. Bennett, Reinvigorating and
Enhancing Jury Trials Through an Overdue Juror Bill of Rights: A Federal Trial Judge’s View,
48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 481, 510–15 (2016) (discussing jury note-taking and allowing jurors to ask
questions). See generally NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES (2007) (providing
a comprehensive assessment of the American jury system).
365. See Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 451, 498 (2006).
366. Carroll, supra note 360, at 827.
367. Kleinfeld, supra note 31, at 1381 (quoting WEBER, supra note 43, at 891, 976).
368. Cf. supra Section II.C.7 (discussing public consensus).
369. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
370. Id. at 406, 410 (noting that “the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the
interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of
laymen” and holding that unanimity “does not materially contribute to the exercise of this
commonsense judgment” (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970))). But see
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 397 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“I think the Fourteenth
Amendment alone clearly requires that if a State purports to accord the right of trial by jury in a
criminal case, then only a unanimous jury can return a constitutionally valid verdict.”).
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the Supreme Court decided the case of Ramos v. Louisiana.371 The jury
in Ramos’s case had convicted him on a 10–2 vote of second-degree
murder after about two hours of deliberation, and Ramos was sentenced
to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 372 The Supreme Court
reversed Apodaca and held that the jury unanimity requirement was
incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment and “applied to state and
federal criminal trials equally.”373 The Ramos Court unsurprisingly
framed its decision in terms of constitutional issues: the original meaning
of the jury trial guarantee, the incorporation debate, and stare decisis. But
Ramos also paid some attention to membership and deliberation.
As for membership, the Court acknowledged that the state law
provision allowing nonunanimous verdicts was passed in the Jim Crow
era to diminish the influence of Black jurors.374 In her concurrence,
Justice Sotomayor wrote that the 1898 Louisiana state constitutional
convention “approved non-unanimous juries as one pillar of a
comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures against
African-Americans, especially in voting and jury service.”375 If ten jurors
decide to ignore the other two, this effectively diminishes the voting
power of those two jurors (especially if they are racial minorities) because
their vote is not needed to convict; if the two dissenting jurors are
marginalized because of their race, their membership is devalued.376
As for deliberation, the Ramos court paid some attention to how the
unanimity requirement might affect case outcomes.377 Admitting that the
unanimity requirement made hung juries more likely, the majority argued
that hung juries might simply be an example of a jury doing exactly as it
should: “[D]eliberating carefully and safeguarding against overzealous
prosecutions.”378 The court, citing five studies, asked: “And what about
the fact, too, that some studies suggest that the elimination of unanimity
has only a small effect on the rate of hung juries? Or the fact that others
profess to have found that requiring unanimity may provide other
possible benefits, including more open-minded and more thorough
371. 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
372. See Brief for Petitioner at 11–12, Ramos v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (No. 185924), 2019 WL 2451204, at *11.
373. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397.
374. Id. at 1394; see also Aliza B. Kaplan & Amy Saack, Overturning Apodaca v. Oregon
Should Be Easy: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases Undermine the Credibility of
Our Justice System, 95 OR. L. REV. 1, 43 (2016) (noting that Oregon’s nonunanimous jury rule
was adopted to silence the views of minorities).
375. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
376. The Apodaca Court rejected the argument that unanimity was necessary to protect the
cross-section of the community requirement. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972).
377. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1401.
378. Id.
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deliberations?”379 A jury that can convict on a 10–2 vote need not
necessarily deliberate as much or as well as a jury that needs all twelve
votes to convict; unanimity encourages better and more inclusive
deliberations.
This Article’s objection to nonunanimous verdicts assumes that the
attorneys have peremptory challenges, which often operate to remove
prospective jurors with diverse perspectives from the venire.380 This
magnifies the importance of the remaining diverse jurors to have a voice,
a voice that unanimous verdicts would preserve. However, if peremptory
challenges were curtailed or abolished, it might make more sense for the
Constitution to allow nonunanimous verdicts. Regardless of how this
debate is resolved, the key theoretical insight is that unanimity rules must
carefully weigh the principles of equal membership and effective
deliberations.
C. Participation
The final ideal of the citizenship triad to be applied to jury trials is
participation. Although jury trials are rare, “[m]ore than one-third of
eligible Americans will serve as a juror at least once in their lifetime.”381
The Supreme Court recently recognized that “[o]ther than voting, serving
on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to
participate in the democratic process.”382 As such, apart from benefiting
defendants, jury trial service can provide certain benefits for the people
as a whole.
Jury service educates and empowers the people. It teaches them
hands-on about their own laws and government.383 As Tocqueville
famously observed,
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, . . . is the
soundest preparation for free institutions. . . .
It may be regarded as a gratuitous public school, ever
open, in which every juror learns his rights . . . and becomes
practically acquainted with the laws . . . .384
379. Id. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1189–91 (1995) (arguing for a supermajority rule to take the place of
unanimity in creating more diverse juries and preventing peremptory challenges).
380. See discussion supra Section III.A.
381. Klein, Truth and Legitimacy, supra note 342, at 65.
382. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019).
383. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1105, 1136–37, 1157 (2014).
384. Amar, supra note 320, at 1186 (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 295–96 (Vintage ed. 1945) (1835)).
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In that same vein, one Anti-Federalist essayist wrote in 1789 that even
though many ordinary people were “much degraded in the powers of the
mind,” jury service could enlighten them: “Give them power and they
will find understanding to use it.”385
In modern times, jury service still brings a wide range of social
benefits. It requires people to work together for a common purpose. In
the course of their service, jurors may develop long-term social
connections with their neighbors and they may learn or refine social skills
that are helpful in other social contexts.386 People who have served on a
jury are also more likely to vote.387
Other reforms are necessary to allow more people to participate in jury
service. Of the many ways that people participate in criminal justice
citizenship (e.g., voting, protesting, working in politics, serving on a
community advisory board), most of them are voluntary. Unusual among
rights,388 jury service (like some military service) is compulsory. Citizens
are compensated monetarily only in a very small measure for their
time.389 Not surprisingly, this service requires more of a sacrifice than
most people feel they can make.390 Nevertheless, in light of the benefits
of jury service, one author has called for one week of paid, mandatory
jury duty per citizen per year, with government-provided childcare.391
Other proposals have been put forth to reduce the burden of jury
service. For example, one judge proposed more efficient management of
the trial, including reducing “unnecessary, cumulative, and excessive
evidence,” eliminating party-requested sidebars, using technology to
streamline voir dire, putting “hard time limits” on opening statements and
closing arguments, and careful planning in the final pretrial
conference.392
385. Id. at 1187 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Essays by a Farmer (IV), in 5 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 39 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (1789)).
386. FERGUSON, supra note 8, at 75–76.
387. Goldbach & Hans, supra note 291, at 2720–21.
388. Peter H. Schuck, Three Models of Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICA AND EUROPE
151, 153 (Michael S. Greve & Michael Zöller eds., 2009) (calling jury duty “a right of democratic
participation in self-governance”).
389. Federal trial jurors are paid $50 per day for the first week and up to $60 per day after
serving ten days. Juror Pay, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/
juror-pay [https://perma.cc/FYG9-WURQ]. Philadelphia jurors are paid $9 a day for the first three
days and $25 a day thereafter. Lucia Geng, Why Pennsylvania Jury Duty Pays $9 Per Day, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Aug. 26, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvania/jury-dutypay-pennsylvania-curious-philly-20190826.html [https://perma.cc/HWY8-JSJA].
390. See Nancy S. Marder, Expanding the Jury: A Provocative Proposal, 35 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 68, 74–75 (2016) (reviewing APPLEMAN, supra note 8).
391. Amar, supra note 320, at 1178–79.
392. Bennett, supra note 364, at 493–99.
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A key issue about juries is whether they do their job well. Criminal
justice citizenship is not served merely by having more people participate
in juries because if juries do not reach correct outcomes, membership
concerns, such as equality, solidarity, and legitimacy, are defeated. True,
popular participation has some value of its own,393 but not enough to
justify, for example, racially determined or otherwise arbitrary
outcomes.394 Ideally, society would reap the benefits of a jury-based
system while still providing fair and accurate trials. This Article has
already discussed the racial composition of juries above in Section III.A.
and the effectiveness of jury deliberations in Section III.B. This Article
now turns to the problem of giving trial juries a role to which they are
well-suited.
The role of modern juries has changed. At the Founding, jury
decisions were more normative than legal.395 There were no structured
criminal codes to interpret and apply.396 Juries kept the peace in a
“communal legal culture” of well-known substantive criminal laws.397
They determined criminal culpability based on moral blameworthiness
instead of the more technical modern definitions.398 This is not to idealize
the past, but only to say that modern trial juries, in contrast, mostly apply
technical law to facts and have little room for equitable discretion.399
Within proper bounds, a jury might be ideally suited to apply equitable
discretion. “[L]aypeople are particularly good at desert judgments”
dealing with “[q]uestions of proportionality, blameworthiness, and social
responsibility.”400
Some scholars have proposed that nullification is an appropriate use
of jury discretion.401 Stated very simply, nullification occurs when “jurors
refuse to apply the law to a given set of facts.”402 This raises serious rule393. See supra Section II.B.
394. See Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1668 (2017)
(applying this reasoning to jury nullification, which may correct normative injustice at the expense
of sullying the law).
395. Id. at 1660.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1660–61 (quoting Jessica K. Lowe, A Separate Peace? The Politics of Localized
Law in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 788, 793 (2011) (book review)).
398. Id. at 1661.
399. See id. at 1662. Equitable discretion has been defined as “a gentle art of particular
perception, a temper of mind that refuses to demand retribution without understanding the whole
story.” Id. at 1665 (quoting Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 92
(1993)).
400. Id. at 1666.
401. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995).
402. Brenner M. Fissell, Jury Nullification and the Rule of Law, 19 LEGAL THEORY 217, 218
(2013).
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of-law concerns because it allows jurors to ignore duly enacted laws in
lieu of their own preferences.403 In contrast, a jury may properly acquit
for interpretive reasons (e.g., jurors could theoretically say “the law as
written does not apply here” or even “the law applies by its terms but was
not intended to apply to these facts”) or equitable reasons (e.g., when the
circumstances of the case counsel for leniency).404 This is in line with the
proposal of the democratizers: the trial jury should “have the right and
should be informed of its right to make judgments of both fact and law
and to acquit based on an overall equitable judgment regarding the
propriety of holding the accused criminally liable.”405
This Article has discussed how jury adjudication could strongly
support the three pillars of criminal justice citizenship. The converse is
also true: the collapse of the jury trial has weakened citizenship. As has
been well-documented elsewhere, plea bargaining has supplanted jury
trials in the American criminal justice system.406 In doing so, it has
silenced the people’s voice in adjudication and deprived the citizenry of
the right to adjudicate and the benefits thereof. Scholars have long
advocated that plea bargaining be banned but to no avail.407 Many
reforms to plea bargaining have been proposed, but some are much more
supportive of criminal justice citizenship than others. Perhaps the best
hope for preserving citizenship in criminal justice is to reform plea
bargaining in such a way that citizens still have meaningful ways to
participate in criminal adjudication.408
CONCLUSION
The American criminal justice system has a unique history of citizen
involvement. That involvement served not only to protect citizens,
including the criminally accused, from their own government, but also to
ensure that citizens in fact governed themselves. The people’s role in
government was meant to be and should remain expansive, and this is all
the more true when it comes to criminal justice, where the government’s
power to deprive liberty is at its apex.
The principles of membership, deliberation, and participation best
define the people’s role in criminal justice. These principles provide a
403. Id. at 222; see Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579, 581 (2014).
404. See Fissell, supra note 402, at 217.
405. Kleinfeld et al., supra note 52, at 1701.
406. See generally FISHER, supra note 15 (describing the demise of the criminal jury trial in
the United States and the rise of plea bargaining in its place).
407. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 934 (1983); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2003 (1992).
408. I intend to address this question in future work. See Daniel S. McConkie, Plea
Bargaining for the People (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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wider perspective of criminal law and procedure than is usually found in
legal scholarship. Without a doubt, providing accurate and fair
adjudication for the accused is essential. But who provides this
adjudication matters. To the extent that the people can do it themselves,
or at least have a strong voice in it, a host of benefits can be realized,
including strengthened solidarity and greater legitimacy in criminal
justice.
Of course, popular participation should not work against certain
procedural ideals that, while sometimes counter-majoritarian, are
necessary for any stable and morally defensible democracy. Those ideals,
rooted in the membership concerns outlined above, include providing
reasonably accurate results, reducing discrimination and arbitrariness,
and promoting a version of criminal justice that attempts to re-stitch torn
social fabric instead of just throwing it away. Thus, instead of removing
experts from criminal justice, this Article’s theory of criminal justice
citizenship calls for a close examination of particular features of the
system to determine the proper role for lay people and experts. In most
cases, justice will be served when they work together, specializing in the
tasks they are best suited to handle.
The trial jury provides a great example of an institution that has served
America well but needs to be updated to accord with modern
understandings of group deliberation, equal protection under the law, and
scientific advances. So reformed, juries can continue to provide a way for
citizens to resist a complete takeover by the bureaucracy and to govern
themselves.
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